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Judges Playing Jury: 
Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding 
Fair Use on Summary Judgment 
Ned Snow* 
Issues of fair use in copyright cases are today decided as pure issues of 
law on summary judgment. But it was not always so. For two centuries, 
juries routinely decided these issues in actions at law. The law recognized 
that fair use issues were highly subjective and thereby inherently factual 
— unfit for summary disposition by a judge. Today, however, all this has 
been forgotten. Judges are characterizing factual issues as purely legal so 
that fair use may be decided at summary judgment. Even while judges 
acknowledge that reasonable minds may disagree on these issues, they 
characterize the issues as legal, preventing them from ever reaching a 
jury. This practice contravenes a history of fair use that precedes and 
informs the Bill of Rights, suggesting that judges are now violating the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury. And by removing the jury from the 
fair use analysis, judges have weakened the substantive doctrine, 
ultimately diluting the strength of fair use expression. That dilution is 
impinging on fair users’ First Amendment right of free speech. This Article 
examines why courts have changed their characterization of fair use from 
issue of fact to issue of law and the constitutional conflicts that have 
resulted from that change. It proposes a return to the original conception 
of fair use: a fact-intensive inquiry that preserves the constitutional rights 
of free speech and the civil jury. 
 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author 
expresses appreciation to Professors Eugene Volokh, Stephen Sheppard, Tomás 
Gómez-Arostegui, and Thomas Lee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this Article. The author also recognizes the valuable research assistance of Michael 
Thompson and Christopher Warzecha. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For nearly two centuries, judges at common law refrained from 
deciding issues of fair use in copyright cases, reserving these issues for 
the jury.1 This was because issues of fair use raise subjective questions 
over which reasonable minds often disagree; the subjectivity of fair use 
placed these questions within the exclusive province of the jury.2 
Thus, it was once well established that issues of fair use were factual 
and that these issues should rarely, if ever, be decided on summary 
judgment.3 
Today, fair use is nearly always decided on summary judgment.4 
Modern judges treat issues of fair use as pure issues of law, so that 
even where reasonable minds may disagree on whether a use is fair, 
the judge decides the issue rather than the jury.5 The very same issues 
 
 1 E.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b) (K.B.) 140 (Lord 
Mansfield) (“In all these [copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying 
work] the question of fact to come before a jury is, Whether the alteration be 
colourable or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or 
not.”); Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680 (Lord Ellenborough) (“I 
shall address these observations to the jury, leaving them to say, whether what so 
taken or supposed to be transmitted from the plaintiff’s book, was fairly done with a 
view of compiling a useful book, for the benefit of the public, upon which there has 
been a totally new arrangement of such matter, — or taken colourable, merely with a 
view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?”); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623-
24 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.) (characterizing inquiry into whether use of 
copyrighted material is permissible as “question of fact to come to a jury”); DC 
Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds that “the four factors 
listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for 
the jury”). 
 2 See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“Summary judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts 
have been reluctant to make subjective determinations.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-74 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting idea 
of deciding copyright issues on summary judgment). 
 4 See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“[I]t is well established that a court can resolve the issue of fair use on a 
motion for summary judgment.”); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 
F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder 
on issue of fair use); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-92 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(same); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 
1998) (same). 
 5 See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 993, 997 (9th Cir. 
1998) (interpreting case law as “rejecting argument that fair use is appropriate for 
determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could have 
decided the question differently,” while affirming grant of summary judgment for 
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which were once well established as factual for a jury are today purely 
legal for a judge.6 The contradiction could not be more blatant. 
Curiously, nothing has been said to justify this change. Over the 
course of a few years, judges inadvertently adopted the present 
approach of judicial disposition on summary judgment over the 
historical approach of jury deliberation at trial.7 The change occurred 
subtly and silently, going unnoticed both in court and in the 
academy.8 Neither reasoned analysis nor thoughtful discussion 
accompanied the change.9 This is troubling, especially because issues 
of fair use affect speech rights: fair use represents constitutionally 
protected speech.10 Moreover, the history of courts sending fair use 
issues to the jury predates and informs the Bill of Rights, implying that 
the Seventh Amendment mandates jury consideration.11 In short, 
judges today are routinely bypassing the jury to the detriment of the 
fair use doctrine, the defendants’ right of free speech, and the litigants’ 
right to a civil jury. 
This Article calls for a return to the former classification of fair use 
issues as inherently factual for jury consideration. Part I briefly 
explains the fair use doctrine. Part II examines the question of 
whether fair use issues should be classified as factual or legal. It 
concludes that the nature of these issues demands their factual 
 
copyright holder on issue of fair use); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 
955 F. Supp. 260, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[W]here the district court has ‘facts 
sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,’ it may conclude as a matter of law 
that the challenged use is not a protected fair use.”), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (“It is 
appropriate to dispose of the issue of fair use on a motion for summary judgment 
because the Court has ‘found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory 
factors.’ ”). 
 6 See discussion infra Part III (discussing historical change in characterization of 
fair use from fact to law). 
 7 See discussion infra Part III.A (examining initial case law that gave rise to 
changed characterization).  
 8 One scholar did allude to the change: a two-sentence passing reference arises in 
a leading copyright treatise. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 12.10[B][4], at 12-193 & n.115 (2009) (“[T]he older view is that the 
issue whether similarity between two works is fair use presented a triable issue of fact. 
Under the modern view . . . the court may resolve the fair use defense as a matter of 
law on summary judgment.”).  
 9 See discussion infra Part III.A.  
 10 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as “free 
speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation[]”); see also discussion 
infra Part IV.B. 
 11 See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A.1 (examining history of jury considering 
issues relating to fair use and implications of that history under Seventh Amendment).  
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classification. Part III recounts the history of juries deciding fair use 
issues at common law and the shift to judges deciding those issues. 
Part IV examines the constitutional implications of deciding these 
issues on summary judgment, questioning whether judges are denying 
litigants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury and whether judges 
are threatening defendants’ First Amendment right of speech. The 
Article concludes that judges should refrain from deciding fair use 
issues on summary judgment.  
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF FAIR USE 
Copyright law provides an author of expression a right to exclude 
others from using that expression.12 This general right of exclusion is 
not without limits, however.13 The right ceases where the use in 
question is deemed to be fair.14 Authors, or copyright holders,15 may 
control all uses of their expression that are not fair uses.16 Determining 
whether a use is fair may, therefore, be dispositive to a copyright 
holder’s claim of copyright infringement. 
As a limit on copyright, the doctrine of fair use protects those 
persons who use another’s expression without permission but in a fair 
manner.17 Deciding what is fair can be difficult and complex, often 
turning on circumstances unique to each case.18 For this reason, there 
is no precise definition or test for fair use that will fit all situations.19 
Fair use is instead intended to contemplate all factual circumstances 
that could possibly justify a particular use of the expression.20 
In the absence of a precise definition or test for fair use, the law sets 
forth general guidelines that may be considered in determining 
fairness.21 Specifically, the Federal Copyright Act lists four factors to 
consider in determining whether a use is fair.22 These factors are 
 
 12 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 13 See id. § 107. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Any distinction between authors and copyright holders is irrelevant for the 
purpose of this Article. 
 16 See id. § 107. 
 17 See id.  
 18 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) 
(“The endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in 
particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the [fair use] statute.”). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
 21 See id. 
 22 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Act does not specify who is to make this determination 
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discretionary and non-exclusive: any of the factors might not be 
weighed, and other factors not listed in the Act may be weighed, in 
determining fairness.23 In practice, though, usually only the four factors 
are considered.24 The first factor examines the purpose and character of 
a defendant’s use, which includes an examination into whether the use 
has transformed the original expression and whether the use serves a 
noncommercial purpose.25 The second factor examines the nature of 
the copyrighted work, where works of a more creative nature tend 
against a finding of fairness and works of a more factual nature tend 
toward a finding of fairness.26 The third factor examines the amount 
and substantiality of the work that the defendant has used.27 The fourth 
factor examines the effect that the defendant’s use has on the value of, 
or a potential market for, the copyrighted work.28 
Applying these factors to any given factual situation produces 
inferences that speak to the extent that a defendant’s use may be fair. 
For instance, applying the first factor to the situation where a person 
copies excerpts from an author’s book for the purpose of critically 
reviewing the book yields a possible inference that the copying has 
transformed the copied expression: the copier’s critical analysis 
potentially casts the copied expression in a new light and thereby 
potentially transforms the copied expression.29 Such an inference that 
arises in the four-factor analysis must be weighed and viewed in the 
context of the other inferences that arise in that analysis.30 Depending 
on the circumstances of a particular use, individual inferences may 
weigh more or less heavily than other inferences.31 In the example of 
copying excerpts from a book for a critical review, although that 
circumstance might yield an inference that the use is transformative, 
 
— judge or jury. 
 23 Id.; see, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (recognizing public interest in receiving newsworthy event as possible 
factor in applying fair use); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same). 
 24 See 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING & THE ARTS § 1:25, at 1-99 (3d ed. 2007); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair 
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (1990). 
 25 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79. 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 107; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). 
 27 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 28 Id.; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
 29 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing criticism as example of fair use); Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 591-92 (noting likely fairness of critical review). 
 30 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78. 
 31 Id. at 590-91. 
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that inference might not weigh much in the overall analysis if, for 
instance, further inferences arose under the third and fourth factors 
that the copied portion constituted the most substantial portion of the 
book and that consumers purchased the critical review as a substitute 
for purchasing the original work.32 The weight of each inference must 
be determined in relation to the other inferences drawn in the four-
factor analysis. Traditionally, the inferences that arise under the first 
and fourth factors — the degree to which the use is transformative and 
the degree to which the use suggests a negative commercial effect — 
have weighed heaviest in the analysis.33 Nevertheless, all inferences 
must ultimately be weighed together to produce an affirmative or 
negative answer to the question of fairness.34 
II. FAIR USE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Today disputes over fair use are nearly always decided at summary 
judgment.35 In prior years, they were always decided at trial.36 The 
reason for this difference is that courts have changed their 
characterization of the inferences in the four-factor analysis — once 
factual, they are now purely legal.37 Under Federal Rule of Civil 
 
 32 Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 
(1985) (rejecting argument that reporting newsworthy expression constituted fair use 
on grounds that defendant used “heart” of copyrighted work). 
 33 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (explaining importance of first factor); Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (acknowledging importance of fourth factor). 
 34 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 35 See Electronic Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 4 n.1, Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661-NG (D. Mass. July 14, 2009) (“[I]t is 
clear that a strikingly large number of courts decide fair use at summary judgment.”); 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 554 (2008) (noting empirical trend demonstrating “remarkable 
increase in the prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that began in the 
mid-1990s and has continued to the present”). 
 36 E.g., cases cited infra note 190; see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 
12.10[B][4], at 12-193.  
 37 See discussion infra Part III. Compare DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially 
factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”), MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 
F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he issue of fair use is one of fact.”), and 
Eisenschiml v. Fawcette Publ’ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957) (“[T]he issue 
of fair use is a question of fact.”), with Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 
F.3d 792, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing first-factor inquiry into transformation 
as legal issue), Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-
46 (2d Cir. 1998) (treating issues in four-factor analysis as legal, appropriate for 
summary judgment), and Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(pronouncing inferences in four-factor analysis as being “legal in nature”). 
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Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”), summary judgment is appropriate only if 
no genuine issue of material fact exists; issues of law, by contrast, may 
be resolved on summary judgment regardless of their complexity.38 
Despite Rule 56’s teaching on the appropriateness (and 
inappropriateness) of treating issues of law and issues of fact on 
summary judgment, Rule 56 never sets forth any criteria for classifying 
whether an issue is legal or factual.39 The classification is left to the 
common law.  
In the context of fair use, whether issues should be classified as legal 
or factual is an important question because the inferences in the four-
factor analysis often raise issues that are close calls. Reasonable minds 
often disagree over which of competing inferences in the four-factor 
analysis should prevail and how much weight any particular inference 
merits.40 In that analysis, choosing between competing inferences and 
assigning a weight to those inferences requires judgments over which 
reasonable minds often differ — judgments that are close calls.41 And 
whereas issues of fact that raise close calls cannot be decided on 
summary judgment, issues of law that raise close calls can.42 So when 
judges once classified the inferences in the four-factor analysis as 
factual, summary judgment was inappropriate under Rule 56 if 
reasonable minds could disagree on the question of fairness.43 When 
judges changed their classification of the inferences from factual to 
 
 38 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY 
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2725, at 410-12 (3d ed. 1998) (“The 
fact that difficult questions of law exist or that the parties differ on the legal 
conclusions to be drawn from the facts is not in and of itself a ground for denying 
summary judgment.”). 
 39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 40 See generally Leval, supra note 24, at 1106-07 (observing great disparity among 
opinions on whether fair use applies). 
 41 Cf. Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (“The substantive emptiness of fair use 
makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t 
manage in other areas.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use 
Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (2007) (“[S]cholars generally agree that it is now 
virtually impossible to predict the outcome of fair use cases.”); R. Polk Wagner, The 
Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 426-27 
(2005) (“[T]here is little more that can be usefully said about the division between fair 
and unfair uses in practice: The ‘know it when you see it’ nature of the analytic 
approach in this context simply precludes such observations.”). 
 42 See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2725, at 410-12. 
 43 See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“The four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are 
normally questions for the jury.”). 
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legal, summary judgment became appropriate under Rule 56, 
regardless of whether reasonable minds would disagree.44 
As discussed below in Part III, this change in the classification of the 
inferences arose without deliberation or reasoned analysis.45 Neither 
courts nor scholars have ever provided any basis for changing the 
classification of these inferences from factual to legal.46 The change 
simply occurred. Overnight and without consideration, courts 
discarded the centuries-old method for deciding fair use — the jury — 
as they relabeled factual inferences to be conclusions of law.47 
The change in characterization raises the question of whether courts 
were correct to institute that change. This Part answers that question, 
examining whether the inferences in the fair use analysis should be 
classified as legal for a judge or factual for a jury. Section A provides 
the context of those inferences as they relate to a defendant’s use of a 
plaintiff’s work, briefly explaining the distinction between historical 
facts and the inferences that arise from those facts. After that 
explanation, Section B articulates arguments for classifying those 
inferences as factual.48 It then addresses counterarguments purporting 
that the inferences should be classified as legal.49 This Part ultimately 
concludes that these inferences must be deemed factual for jury 
consideration. 
A. Historical Facts Underlying Inferences 
Two types of issues exist in the fair use analysis.50 The first type 
concerns what actually happened (e.g., what use the defendant 
actually made of the work).51 The second type concerns whether what 
happened suggests fairness (e.g., whether the use should be 
considered transformative).52 The first type of issues are indisputably 
fact issues for a jury.53 The second type represent issues that require 
 
 44 See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“[I]t is well established that a court can resolve the issue of fair use on a 
motion for summary judgment.”). 
 45 See discussion infra Part III. 
 46 See discussion infra Part III. 
 47 See discussion infra Part III. 
 48 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 49 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 50 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183-84 (D. Mass. 
2007) (drawing distinction between historical facts and interpretation of those facts). 
 51 See id.  
 52 See id.  
 53 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 12.10[A], at 12-185. 
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the application of a legal principle to a factual circumstance.54 It is 
these second type of issues over which disagreement lies regarding 
whether they should be characterized as factual for a jury or legal for a 
judge.55 Nevertheless, a brief explanation of the first type of issues 
provides context for a discussion of the second type of issues.  
As a general matter in every area of law, any issue is factual that 
examines whether an action or condition has happened or existed.56 
Such issues are often referred to as issues of historical fact in that they 
represent questions regarding what happened in the past.57 In this 
sense, a historical fact is objectively verifiable.58 Did the defendant pull 
the trigger? What speed was the car going? What day did the 
defendant enter onto the property? With sufficient evidence, 
reasonable minds will reach only one answer to these issues of 
historical fact. 
Issues of historical fact arise in the fair use analysis. Consider the 
proposition that a defendant copied the plaintiff’s work, that the 
defendant used the work in a certain manner, or that the copyrighted 
work appeals to a specific market of consumers — all these 
propositions represent historical facts.59 Issues surrounding these 
verifiable propositions are well recognized as factual in nature, i.e., 
historical issues of fact.60 In fair use, historical facts consist of the use 
that a defendant has made of the copyrighted work as well as the 
content, origin, and history of the copyrighted work.61 Because 
 
 54 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) 
(“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”). 
 55 Compare DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“[T]he four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are 
normally questions for the jury”), with Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84 (“As to 
fair use, the parties’ disagreements are over the interpretation of facts. As these are 
questions of law, I analyze them below.”). 
 56 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1995) (describing historical 
fact as “a recital of external events”); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and 
Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1924) (“The primary and popular meaning of the 
word ‘fact’ is something which has happened or existed.”); Stephen A. Weiner, The 
Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1869-70 (1966) 
(describing question of fact as arising “[w]hen there is a dispute as to what acts or 
events have actually occurred, or what conditions have actually existed”). 
 57 See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 109-10. 
 58 See Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE 
L.J. 667, 668 (1949). 
 59 See Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84 (characterizing “material historical 
facts” in fair use analysis as “the origin, history, content, and defendant’s use of 
plaintiff’s [copyrighted work]”). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
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historical facts represent objectively verifiable conditions or events, a 
factfinder may draw only one conclusion as to the factual meaning of 
evidence with a sufficient amount of evidence. So if a defendant 
admits to copying a plaintiff’s work and identifies the copyrighted 
work that belongs to the plaintiff, the factfinder may draw only one 
conclusion as to the historical fact that the defendant has copied the 
plaintiff’s work. Likewise, if a plaintiff and defendant agree on how the 
defendant used the copy, the factfinder may draw only one conclusion 
as to this historical fact. Thus, courts uniformly recognize that certain 
issues in the fair use inquiry are factual in nature — issues of 
historical fact. 
If historical facts are ever disputed, they represent questions for the 
jury.62 But in fair use disputes, historical facts are not usually 
disputed.63 Defendants either admit or assume arguendo that they have 
used the plaintiff’s work, and there is rarely dispute over the history, 
content, or origin of the copyrighted work. But the inferences that are 
drawn from these historical facts are greatly disputed. These inferences 
arise in the four-factor analysis of fair use.64 Specifically, the historical 
facts facilitate inferences as to the character and purpose of the use, 
including the extent to which the use is transformative; the nature of 
the copyrighted work (i.e., factual or creative); the significance of the 
amount that the defendant has used; the extent to which that amount 
constitutes a substantial portion of the work; and the potential market 
impact of the use.65 Whereas historical facts are not usually disputed, 
the inferences arising from those facts are often disputed. 
B. Issues in the Four-Factor Analysis 
As stated above, applying the four factors to the historical facts 
yields inferences in the fair use analysis. Another way of stating this is 
 
 62 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 12.10[A], at 12-185. 
 63 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84. 
 64 See, e.g., discussion supra Part I (explaining inferences in four-factor analysis). 
 65 The last inference — market impact — may be formed from the historical fact 
of the history of a copyrighted work, which history would include its past 
performance in the commercial market and the effect of the defendant’s use on that 
performance. Although litigants may dispute the effect that has occurred, more often 
it would seem they dispute the potential effect of the use. See, e.g., Peter Letterese & 
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1317 (11th Cir. 
2008) (observing that copyright holder conceded that defendant’s use did not cause 
harmful effect on market, but that question remained as to whether widespread use 
like defendant’s use would result in adverse harm to potential market). The potential 
use of the effect is not a historical fact, but rather an inference in the four-factor 
analysis. 
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that in applying the legal principles outlined in the statutory factors to 
the historical facts, inferences arise that affect the ultimate issue of 
whether the defendant’s use is fair.66 Choosing between competing 
inferences, and their weight in the overall analysis, raises issues that 
must be resolved. The appropriateness of resolving these issues on 
summary judgment depends on whether they represent genuine issues 
of material fact, or alternatively, issues of law.67 It is therefore 
necessary to determine whether the inferences to be drawn from the 
historical facts are factual or legal in the four-factor analysis. 
The classification of issues that arise from applying a legal principle 
to a historical fact is uncertain in the law as a general matter. If a 
choice must be made among inferences that arise in applying law to 
fact, that choice may be viewed as raising either a legal issue, a factual 
issue, or an issue of mixed law and fact.68 In some instances, that 
choice among inferences is referred to as an issue of fact for a jury; in 
other instances as an issue of law for a judge; and in still other 
instances as a mixed issue of law and fact for jury or judge depending 
on the area of law.69 For example, consider the application of the legal 
principle of reasonableness to factual circumstances in different 
contexts: in the context of negligence, it is a question of fact as to 
 
 66 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome, Inc., 387 
F.3d 403, 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom, when viewed through the lens of the statutory fair use factors, 
support the jury’s fair use finding.”). 
 67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 68 See NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, 
J.) (“The controversy whether application of established legal standards to raw 
evidentiary material is a question of law or of fact is an old one.”); 9 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2550, at 640 (1981) (opining that it 
is “possible only to indicate the trend of some of the main subjects of controversy or 
difficulty” when contemplating whether interpretation of evidence falls to judge or 
jury); Weiner, supra note 56, at 1872 (pointing out “constant difficulty” that courts 
encounter in allocating decision-making between judge and jury). Compare James B. 
Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 169-70 (1890) (declaring 
that mixed questions of law and fact constitute matters of fact for jury consideration), 
with OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 97-99 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (arguing that experienced judges should determine 
issues that require application of law to fact where facts under consideration arise 
frequently). Compare 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2729, at 533-36 
(outlining cases discussing factual nature of issues applying legal principle of 
reasonableness to factual situation), and id. § 2730 (discussing actions where 
application of law to fact in order to determine whether defendant has particular state 
of mind is factual issue for jury), with id. § 2730.1 (discussing disparity in whether 
issues treated as law or fact for summary judgment purposes in context of contract 
interpretation). 
 69 See sources cited supra note 68. 
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whether a defendant has acted reasonably where his action (or failure 
to act) has injured a plaintiff;70 in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is a question of law as to whether police officers have 
acted reasonably where their actions resulted in a seizure;71 in the 
context of contract, it is a mixed question of law and fact as to 
whether a defendant insurer has acted reasonably where it has refused 
to pay a claim.72 
The reason for the variance in classifying such issues is that the fact-
law distinction ultimately depends on which institution — judge or 
jury — is best able to decide the issue.73 In some areas of law, a judge 
is better situated to resolve the issue; in other areas, the jury is better 
suited to do so.74 The institution that is better able to apply law to fact 
in a particular area of law determines whether the issues in that area of 
law are deemed factual or legal.75 Thus, classification as factual or legal 
turns entirely on whether the judge or the jury is the better institution 
for resolving the type of issue.76 
At this point it is well to pause and point out that lawyers generally 
do not think of the fact-law distinction as turning on which institution 
 
 70 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 237 (5th ed. 
1984) (“The question [of reasonableness in negligence] usually is said to be one of fact.”). 
 71 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 & n.8 (2007) (rejecting idea that question 
of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment context is question of fact). 
 72 See, e.g., Ross v. Auto Club Grp., 748 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Mich. 2008) (“The trial 
court’s decision about whether the insurer acted reasonably involves a mixed question 
of law and fact.”). 
 73 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) 
(“[W]hen an issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a 
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned 
than another to decide the issue in question.”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 
(1985) (“[T]he decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of fact,’ or a 
‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of 
analysis.”). 
 74 See 10A-B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, §§ 2729–33 (outlining 
different types of actions in which courts may or may not entertain summary judgment 
owing to which institution, judge or jury, is charged with applying law to fact). 
 75 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-90; Miller, 474 U.S. at 114. 
 76 In some areas of law, courts disagree over which institution is best at resolving a 
particular issue. For instance, in the probate context, courts disagree over the issue of 
whether a defendant’s influence over a testator is undue. Some courts view this as an 
issue of fact for the jury, others as an issue of law for the judge. Compare Bermke v. 
Sec. First Nat’l Bank of Sheboygan, 179 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Wis. 1970) (rejecting 
argument that jury should consider undue influence), with In re Estate of Opsahl, 448 
N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that undue influence is question 
of fact for jury). 
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— judge or jury — is better able to resolve the issue at hand.77 In fact, 
it seems a truism that whether the judge or the jury decides an issue 
depends on whether that issue is legal or factual — not the other way 
around.78 Nevertheless, in the context of issues that arise in applying 
legal principles to historical facts, courts and scholars alike recognize 
that the preference for judge or jury is the basis for the classification as 
legal or factual.79 For instance, judges are thought to be a superior 
institution to jurors in construing written instruments: a judge is 
trained in meanings of words more so than ordinary citizens.80 
Accordingly, contract issues surrounding the interpretation of 
particular words are construed as legal.81 On the other hand, a jury is 
thought to be a superior institution to a judge in understanding how a 
reasonable person would act in everyday life because the jury 
comprises more life experiences than does the judge.82 Accordingly, 
issues that arise in applying the legal principle of reasonableness to 
specific facts in a negligence suit are construed as factual.83 The same 
can be said of conversion. The issue of whether possession is wrongful 
requires life experiences to formulate a judgment of wrongfulness, and 
collectively, the jury has more life experiences than does the judge: the 
 
 77 See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1.7, at 7 (3d 
ed. 1996); Thayer, supra note 68, at 147. 
 78 See Thayer, supra note 68, at 147. 
 79 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, 388-90 (comparing interpretive skills of judge 
and jury in analyzing which institution should decide claim-construction issues of 
patent law); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 148, at 354-55 (2000) [hereinafter 
TORTS]; KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 32, at 237; LILLY, supra note 77, § 1.6, at 7; 
10A-B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, §§ 2729–33; Bohlen, supra note 56, at 
116; Weiner, supra note 56, at 1876 (“[I]t is meaningless to assign the task in a 
specific case to judge or jury simply by use of the law and fact jargon, as courts have 
done. A far preferable solution would be to . . . deal with it as such, not on the basis of 
terminology, but on the basis of policy.”).  
 80 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (“The construction of written instruments is one 
of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened 
by training in exegesis.”). 
 81 See, e.g., Elec. Cable Compounds, Inc. v. Town of Seymour, 897 A.2d 146, 150 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (“[W]here there is definitive contract language, the 
determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a 
question of law.”). Where it is necessary to look outside the contractual language to 
determine the parties’ intent, the issue becomes one of fact for a jury. See id. 
 82 See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2729, at 533 (noting 
particular deference that courts accord jury in deciding issue of reasonableness in 
negligence actions “in light of its supposedly unique competence in applying the 
reasonable person standard to a given fact situation”). 
 83 See id. 
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issue of wrongful possession in a conversion suit is therefore classified 
as factual for the jury.84 
It thus follows that because the issues arising in the four-factor 
analysis of fair use represent issues that require the application of legal 
principles to historical facts, those issues should be regarded as either 
legal or factual based on which institution — judge or jury — is best 
able to resolve them. The sections below examine arguments for both 
institutions. Section 1 examines the arguments for the jury, and section 
2 examines those for the judge. Both sections ultimately conclude that 
the jury is the better institution for resolving these issues. 
1. Issues as Factual Matters for Jury 
This section explains why the jury should decide the issues in the 
four-factor analysis, thereby implying the factual classification of those 
issues. The section sets forth three reasons: the first and chief reason is 
that the characteristic of plurality among jurors is preferable to the 
singularity of the judge in determining whether a use is fair; the 
second is that the Seventh Amendment mandates these issues be 
resolved by a jury; and the third is that the public appears to prefer the 
jury to the judge. 
a. Jury Plurality 
Issues of fair use should lie with the jury for the simple reason that a 
jury comprises a plurality of individuals. The characteristic of plurality 
is paramount in deciding fair use issues because of the nature of those 
issues. As this section discusses, those issues require discretionary 
judgment that is best exercised by an institution with a plurality of life 
experiences.  
Because fair use is a flexible doctrine, lacking a precise definition, it 
is an inherently vague and indeterminate doctrine.85 The broad 
 
 84 See, e.g., McClendon v. DeVoll (In re DeVoll), 266 B.R. 81, 96 n.18 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2001) (reciting definition of conversion given to jury as “the unlawful or 
wrongful exercise of the rights of possession, dominion, ownership or control by one 
person over the property of another”); Tarrant v. Capstone Oil & Gas Co., 178 P.3d 
866, 871 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (recounting that trial court, in requiring jury to 
determine whether facts constituted unlawful conversion, defined conversion for jury 
as “any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal 
property . . .”) (emphasis added); 90 C.J.S. Trover & Conversion § 115 (2010) (“[T]he 
question of whether the facts adduced in evidence establish an unlawful conversion is 
usually a question to be determined by the jury.”). 
 85 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1149 (2007) 
(recognizing that certainty in rules of fair use would cost flexibility of its application); 
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language that describes both the underlying legal standard of fairness 
and its characteristics (e.g., transformative and substantial) requires 
that the institution charged with applying these legal principles to the 
historical facts exercise a good deal of discretionary judgment.86 Stated 
another way, the indeterminacy of fair use requires that the judge or 
juror who draws the fair use inferences inject her own view of what 
should be considered fair.87 The inquiry becomes a normative question 
of characterization, where the criteria employed to reach the correct 
characterization consists of flexible, broad terms.88 Should the 
defendant’s painting of the plaintiff’s photograph be considered 
transformative?89 Should the amount that the defendant used be 
considered substantial? These and other inquiries in the fair use 
analysis require the decisionmaker to exercise discretionary judgment 
and opinion.90  
 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604 (1982) (“[T]he 
ambiguity of the fair use doctrine and its statutory formulation obscure the underlying 
issues and make consistency and predictability difficult to achieve.”); Jessica Litman, 
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 338-50 (2002) (“[T]he question 
whether individuals are liable for copyright infringement when they make 
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works has no clear answer.”). 
 86 See generally Leval, supra note 24, at 1105-07 (noting vagueness of fair use 
doctrine resulting in individualized judgments). 
 87 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and 
Context, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 477, 526-27 (2007) (“What constitutes a transformative 
use is potentially highly subjective.”); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? 
Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, BYU L. REV. 
1201, 1252 (2005) (“[D]rawing the line between transformative and non-
transformative uses is laden with subjectivity.”). 
 88 One evidentiary scholar has observed this phenomenon as a general matter in 
applying legal principles to historical facts:  
In these cases involving a broadly stated legal rule, the jury’s application of 
law to fact involves a characterization of the [historical] facts in the light of 
the jury’s collective experience and its interpretation of the indeterminate 
language that constitutes the legal standard. In a sense, the jury is giving the 
legal principles involved the necessary contextual precision to resolve the 
case before them. 
LILLY, supra note 77, § 1.7, at 8. 
 89 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 11, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 
1:09-CV-01123-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009) (alleging that Hope painting of then-
Senator Obama transforms Associated Press photograph of same image). 
 90 Depending on the historical facts of a case, at least some of the inferences in the 
four-factor analysis usually turn on discretionary judgment and opinion. Of course 
not every instance of applying legal principle to historical fact in the four-factor 
analysis will yield an issue that is vague and indeterminate. Applying the legal 
principle of commerciality to the factual situation where a defendant has sold copied 
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The decisionmaker’s discretionary judgment and opinion will 
depend on the decisionmaker’s social values, and social values vary as 
greatly across society as do life experiences.91 Consider a defendant 
who creates a sculpture that replicates a plaintiff’s copyrighted 
photograph. Life experiences dictate whether a person recognizes 
social value in the sculpted expression independent of the copyrighted 
photograph: perhaps for those whose life experiences teach them the 
significance of details and symbols, the sculpture begets a meaning 
distinct from the copyrighted photograph; perhaps for those whose life 
experiences teach them the principle that reward comes only by 
independent work, the sculpture begets the same meaning of the 
photograph.92 Accordingly, the choice among competing inferences in 
the fair use analysis depends upon the life experiences of the 
decisionmaker. Life experiences affect social values, social values affect 
discretionary judgments, and discretionary judgments affect fair use 
inferences.93 In short, the indeterminate nature of fair use requires 
judgments that turn on individual social values and life experiences. 
This insight suggests that a jury would better draw fair use 
inferences than would a judge.94 Presumably, those inferences should 
reflect as near a consensus of values and opinions across society, for 
the ultimate judgment of fairness is accorded the respect and 
deference of the entire society.95 The disparity of values and opinions 
 
expression for profit in a retail store certainly does not result in a choice of competing 
inferences with respect to the legal principle of commerciality: only one reasonable 
inference may be drawn, i.e., that the defendant has made a commercial use. Some 
factual circumstances give rise to inferences that most (if not all) reasonable persons 
would draw under the governing legal principles. In those factual situations the 
application of law to fact would appear to be straightforward.  
 91 See generally DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 79, § 18, at 33-34 (“[Juries] bring their 
own knowledge of ‘social facts’ to bear on the case.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304-05, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting view that purpose-and-character-of-use factor (transformation) suggested 
fairness where defendant had created sculpture of puppies based on copyrighted 
picture of puppies on postcard). 
 93 Cf. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 636 (4th ed. 1853) (defining “common 
law” as “that which derives its force and authority from the universal consent and 
immemorial practice of the people”). 
 94 Cf. 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 15.2, at 351-52 (2d ed. 
1986) (discussing fact-finding process of jury and noting room for consideration of 
policy to choose between equally indemonstrable generalizations); Bohlen, supra note 
56, at 113 (observing that mixed questions of law and fact regarding whether 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable in negligence context raise social value judgments 
of normative nature). 
 95 In Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), the Second Circuit 
suggested a similar reason for jury consideration of copyright issues:  
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in society is most likely to be reflected in a jury with its several 
members than in a judge.96 Together, members of a jury represent a 
greater breadth of unique life experiences than does a judge. 
Moreover, any one juror’s opinion may not prevail without adequate 
consideration of all other opinions — the host of life experiences 
collectively producing a single opinion on fairness. If an opinion is 
extreme in the view of the collective body, the jury divorces it, 
stripping it of influence in its ultimate collective opinion. By contrast, 
the judge need not reach a collective consensus as he derives values 
and opinions from only his single set of life experiences. If his 
opinions are extreme when compared to those of society, they 
nevertheless remain reasonable to him. Hence, the diversity of life 
experiences among several jurors, coupled with the process of 
collectively reaching a consensus, is more likely to represent a 
mainstream view of society’s diverse cultural norms and social values 
than is the set of personal life experiences of any single judge. If a 
judge resolves fair use issues as a matter of law on summary judgment, 
one person’s life experiences control the relevant cultural standard of 
fairness; if a jury resolves those issues at trial, a plurality of life 
experience controls that standard, and such a plurality more likely 
reflects the views of society.97 A jury’s plurality view better captures 
the correct standard for fairness than a judge’s singular view. 
 
The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the 
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant 
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff. Surely, 
then, we have an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine. 
 96 See generally DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 79, § 18, at 33-34. 
 97 The Supreme Court’s comment in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 
U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664-65 (1873), is instructive on this point: 
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education 
and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning 
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, 
the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their 
separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a 
unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great 
effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the 
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer 
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge. 
. . . 
. . . [W]hen the facts are disputed, or when they are not disputed, but 
different minds might honestly draw different conclusions from them, the 
case must be left to the jury for their determination. 
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Other areas of law further suggest the superiority of the jury over 
the judge at deciding issues involving discretionary judgments that 
turn on value and norm assessments.98 Consider the issue of whether a 
defendant breached his duty of care in negligence: the jury determines 
whether the defendant’s conduct is reasonable, or in other words, 
whether the defendant should have acted differently.99 Or consider the 
issue of whether a defendant converted another’s property: the jury 
determines whether the defendant’s possession was wrongful.100 Or 
consider the issue of whether a defendant acted in good faith: the jury 
determines whether the defendant’s thoughts were appropriate when 
he committed an act.101 Jurors routinely resolve issues that require 
discretionary judgment based on social values and cultural norms.102 
Fair use should not be any different. 
An example of the problems that arise where a judge, rather than a 
jury, decides the issue of fair use arises in the case of Clean Flicks of 
Colorado v. Soderbergh.103 There, the defendants edited content of 
movies that consumers found objectionable, deleting incidents of sex, 
nudity, profanity, and violence, in order to produce — from the 
defendants’ viewpoint — a more socially acceptable version of the 
movies.104 To edit the content, the defendants made an edited copy of 
an original authorized copy, and then they bundled both the original 
copy and the edited copy together for sale to the consumer.105 The 
copyright holders sued for infringement; the defendants argued fair 
use.106 On summary judgment, Judge Richard Matsch ruled for the 
plaintiffs despite the defendants’ argument that factual disputes 
required a jury trial.107 On the issue of transformation, Judge Matsch 
found there to be “nothing transformative about the edited copies” 
 
 98 See DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 79, § 148, at 355 (“Because part of the jury’s role is 
to make normative decisions or value judgments, courts do not normally grant 
summary judgment on negligence issues, even if the facts are undisputed.”). 
 99 Id. § 148, at 354-55; Bohlen, supra note 56, at 113 (describing controlling 
question for jury in deciding issue of reasonableness in negligence case as “not what 
is, but what ought to be”). 
 100 See sources cited supra note 84. 
 101 Weiner, supra note 56, at 1871; e.g., Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454, 457 
(Ala. 1983) (identifying question of whether expenditures were made in good faith as 
question of fact). 
 102 See supra notes 84, 99, 101. 
 103 Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).  
 104 Id. at 1238. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1237, 1239. 
 107 Id. at 1237-38. 
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that the defendants had created.108 For Judge Matsch, the defendants’ 
use was equivalent to creating a verbatim copy of the entire movie and 
then deleting only a few random blips in that copy.109 
Judge Matsch’s life experiences apparently fell short of teaching him 
the reasonableness of the inference that the defendants’ use was 
transformative.110 It appears reasonable that by deleting objectionable 
content, the defendants had created something new — a more socially 
desirable version. For a juror whose life experiences include those of a 
parent who protects his children from morally offensive content, the 
defendant’s use may have transformed the original expression; the use 
would have permitted children to view movies that their parents 
would not have otherwise allowed them to view.111 Judge Matsch, 
 
 108 Id. at 1241. 
 109 See id. 
 110 One can only speculate as to which life experiences may have influenced Judge 
Matsch’s conception of whether the use was transformative. Prior to his appointment 
to the bench by President Nixon, Judge Matsch served as a federal prosecutor, a city 
attorney, and a member of the U.S. Army in its counter-intelligence unit in Korea. 1 
ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11-13 (2009) [hereinafter ALMANAC]. One 
newspaper has noted that Judge Matsch’s upbringing was strict: his parents expected 
him to work two hours in the family store each day following school, and after the 
store work, his mother held daily homework sessions at the kitchen table. See Virginia 
Culver, Trial Judge Mixes Seriousness and Wit, DENVER POST, Apr. 15, 1997, at A-01. 
These experiences could have shaped Judge Matsch’s view of life so that he adopted 
the following principle: legal and proper conduct must rigidly adhere to a governing 
rule. This principle Judge Matsch lives. He runs a tight courtroom, starting court at 
precisely 9:00 a.m., entering the room at 8:59 a.m. See Patrick E. Cole, Don’t Mess 
With Richard Matsch, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 35. No one is allowed in after he enters. 
Id. He has been described as an intolerant curmudgeon with quirky rules. See 1 
ALMANAC, supra, Tenth Circuit, at 13. He keeps in shape by running every day — for 
the past several years. See Culver, supra, at A-01. He eats alone at law conventions to 
avoid any potential conflict of interest. Cole, supra, at 35; Culver, supra, at A-01.  
Judge Matsch’s analysis on the fair use issue of transformation is consistent with his 
apparent view that proper conduct requires rigid adherence to rules. Rigid application 
of the Supreme Court’s definition of transformation — as something that “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning or message” — suggests that the defendant’s use of the 
movies lacked any degree of transformation, for although by presenting a more 
socially acceptable version of the original work the defendants’ use suggested a further 
purpose, different character, and new message, that use did not add anything to the 
original work because it only deleted content — so reasoned Judge Matsch. See Clean 
Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (relying on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). Rigid rule application — a principle in opposition to fair use 
and one that Judge Matsch experiences, lives, and applies — blinded Judge Matsch 
from seeing the reasonableness of a contrary inference. 
 111 See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (labeling as “inconsequential” 
argument that parents value defendants’ editing of content because use allows families 
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however, failed to comprehend that deleting certain content could 
ever transform a work because of his rigid application of the Supreme 
Court’s definition of a transformative work — namely, a work is 
transformative if it “adds something new” to the original work; Judge 
Matsch reasoned that by deleting content the defendants had failed to 
add something new to the original work.112 He failed to appreciate the 
view that the defendants had exercised valuable judgment in deciding 
which portions to delete, judgment that distinguishes their use from 
arbitrary content deletion.113 From his standpoint, content editing was 
not even minimally transformative.114 From a juror’s standpoint, the 
use may well have been entirely reasonable.115 
An implication of this basis for choosing jury over judge — jury 
plurality — is worth noting. The weight of each inference in the fair 
 
to watch movies together that they otherwise could not). 
 112 Id. at 1241 (relying on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994)). By Judge Matsch’s reasoning, then, deleting one word from a sentence would 
neither transform the expressional content nor communicate a different meaning. 
“This sentence is not false” would be no different from “This sentence is false.” 
 113 The value of deleting only blips from a movie lies not in the quantum of deleted 
content, but rather in the judgment to appreciate which blips to delete so as to make 
the expression more socially acceptable while preserving the underlying idea and 
theme. 
 114 Another case illustrating the danger of relying on judicial views of 
reasonableness is Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). There, the defendant 
created a sculpture of puppies based on a postcard picture of puppies in which the 
plaintiff held a copyright. Id. at 304-05. The defendant argued that the purpose of the 
sculpture was to comment on the commonplace of life, which would suggest fairness. 
Id. at 309-10. Both the trial and appellate courts, however, concluded that no 
reasonable jury would view the first factor of fair use, which speaks to the element of 
transformation, as favoring fairness, ultimately finding infringement. Rogers v. Koons, 
751 F. Supp. 474, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 960 F.2d 301, 310-12 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Yet a picture on a postcard and a sculpture of the same picture seem transformative 
from the fact that the form of the expression has changed. Further, the distinction 
between a common postcard and an expensive sculpture, which sold for over a 
hundred thousand dollars, suggests a distinction in meaning, i.e., transformation. It 
therefore seems entirely possible that a reasonable jury could have considered the 
defendant’s use as transformative, suggesting fairness. 
 115 In addition to the first factor, the fourth factor — market impact — Judge 
Matsch held as not favoring fair use. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. He reached 
this conclusion on the basis that the studios were targeting an audience that was 
distinct from the one Clean Flicks was targeting. Id. This reasoning is curious. That 
the studios were withholding their expression from a sort of audience suggests that a 
flaw existed in the market for the expression — indeed a complete market failure — 
which fact usually suggests a finding of fairness, especially in view of the fact that 
Clean Flicks’s use provided the studios market value for the copies used. See generally 
Gordon, supra note 85, at 1615, 1618 (concluding that fair use is appropriate where 
market failure exists, especially where harm to copyright holder is small). 
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use analysis should also be construed as a factual matter for jury 
consideration.116 Factor weight determines the degree of importance of 
each inference in the ultimate decision of whether a use is fair. Like 
the inference itself, the importance of the inference is subject to 
discretionary judgment. That discretionary nature of the issue raises a 
normative question: how important ought this inference be in the 
overall analysis? The answer turns on discretionary judgment and 
opinion, which are formed by life experiences. Consequently, the 
institution with greater life experiences is more likely to reflect 
society’s view of factor weight. The jury, with its plurality of life 
experiences, is thus preferable to the judge in deciding issues related 
to how to weigh each inference in the analysis.  
b. Seventh Amendment 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved.”117 The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
Amendment to mandate a civil jury today only if at the time of the 
Seventh Amendment, a civil jury resolved disputes over similar rights 
existing at common law.118 At the time of the Seventh Amendment, 
courts recognized that issues of fair use were definitional to the 
common-law right of copyright, and so courts reserved these issues for 
the jury.119 Part III.A below discusses this history, and it recounts that 
in the late twentieth century, when judges began deciding these issues 
as a matter of law, they departed from the original practice of sending 
the issues to the jury.120 Hence, to preserve the right of trial by jury as 
it existed in 1791, judges must recognize the historical mandate of the 
Seventh Amendment that juries decide fair use issues. And by 
 
 116 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:60 (2009) [hereinafter 
COPYRIGHT] (“The trier of fact hears all evidence, makes factual determinations about 
the credibility and weight to be given to that evidence, weighs all four factors in light 
of those factual findings, and comes up with a judgment based on applying the law to 
the facts found.”); see, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 80 
(2d Cir. 1997) (“Our own viewing of the episode would incline us to weight the third 
factor less strongly toward the defendants than did Judge Martin, but we are not the 
fact-finders . . . .”). 
 117 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). 
 118 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708-09 
(1999). 
 119 See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A.1. 
 120 See discussion infra Part III.A (observing that fair use existed as principle that 
was definitional to legal right of copyright in 1769, implying its eligibility for jury 
consideration). 
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requiring that the jury decide these issues, the Seventh Amendment 
requires them to be considered issues of fact. 
Moreover, by requiring the right of trial by jury to be preserved, the 
Seventh Amendment appears to articulate a preference for juries where 
uncertainty exists as to whether judge or jury should decide an issue.121 
Preservation of a right requires that in situations where it is unclear 
whether the right applies, the right should apply.122 That is, 
preservation requires that uncertainty favor application. Hence, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved only if that right is presumed in 
cases where it is unclear which institution should decide an issue.123 
Preservation implies presumption. The Seventh Amendment, therefore, 
intimates a preference for jury over judge where ambiguity surrounds 
which institution should decide an issue. Even assuming that it were 
uncertain whether juries or judges decided issues of fair use in 1791, 
the Constitution mandates that that uncertainty favor juries. 
c. Public Preference 
A final reason for preferring jury to judge is that the public seems to 
prefer the jury in fair use cases. Public preference is likely in favor of a 
jury in fair use because a juror, unlike a lawyer or judge, represents 
the ordinary person off the street.124 As in other areas of tort law, it 
seems that the public would prefer one of its own — a layperson — to 
make the subjective determination of whether a member of the public, 
in attempting to create something new, has appropriated expression of 
another. Judges’ continuous treatment of such issues creates a 
potential for rigidity and bias that is oblivious to the human element 
 
 121 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; cf. Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: 
The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 400 
(1995) (noting presumption in favor of juries that Seventh Amendment creates in 
context of examining issue of whether juries should assess damages). 
 122 See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) 
(noting that usual discretion of judges to determine whether to try legal or equitable 
causes first is “very narrowly limited” because of constitutional right to jury trial, such 
that “only under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of 
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims”). 
 123 Cf. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 
139, 148-60 (2007) (contrasting summary procedures of 1791 to present-day 
summary judgment and concluding that present-day summary judgment is 
unconstitutional). 
 124 Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 37, at 237 (explaining that normative 
judgment of reasonableness in negligence law “is to be determined in all doubtful 
cases by the jury, because the public insists that its conduct be judged in part by the 
man in the street rather than by lawyers”). 
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of the conduct at issue.125 Such rigidity and bias carries harsh 
consequences in the form of statutory damages that are punitive-like 
in nature.126 Unsuccessful attempts at fair use become very costly for 
members of the public, so the public preference for a jury would seem 
strong.127 The jury serves as a sort of shock absorber to cushion the 
impact of copyright’s unforgiving and severe nature.128 The judge 
represents justice where the public prefers understanding.  
2. Issues as Legal Matters for Judge 
This section considers arguments in favor of construing the issues in 
the four-factor analysis as legal in nature for a judge to decide. Three 
general arguments are considered: first, that judges are especially 
qualified to decide these issues because of their experience in deciding 
policy matters; second, that judges would provide consistency and 
certainty in the law; and third, that jurors are especially ill qualified 
because of both their likely partiality toward defendants and their 
general inexperience dealing with the complexities of fair use. 
a. Policy Implications 
Fair use issues often raise policy considerations, and a role of judges 
is to consider the policy implications of their decisions.129 In fair use, 
 
 125 Cf. Bohlen, supra note 56, at 116 (explaining reason that juries determine 
standard of reasonableness in negligence actions is because of “the public’s desire to 
have its conduct judged by the layman . . . rather than by the more sophisticated and 
expert judgment of the trained lawyer, whose judicial experience may have given him 
a biased point of view”). 
 126 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (contemplating penalty for each act of 
infringement from anywhere between $750 to $30,000, and up to $150,000 if willful); 
17 U.S.C. § 504 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (“[B]y establishing a realistic floor 
for liability, the provision preserves its intended deterrent effect.”); L.A. News Serv. v. 
Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]wards of 
statutory damages serve . . . punitive purposes.”). 
 127 Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 37, at 237 (citing this reason as basis for jury 
determination in negligence context). 
 128 See id. (“[T]he jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the impact of the 
law.”). Some uses must be deemed fair, although they do not fit nicely into the 
statutory four-factor analysis. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1871, 1903 (2007) (arguing that zone of personal use is uncontroversially 
noninfringing — such as downloading programs on TiVo and forwarding email — 
and that these uses do not fit well within statutory fair use analysis). The jury, it 
would seem, is the mechanism that provides the necessary zone of safety for such fair 
uses that do not fit nicely into the four-factor analysis.  
 129 See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
899, 948-49 (2009) (observing that social policy should affect determinations that 
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policy questions arise regarding whether a finding of fairness will 
promote further creative expression.130 The policies underlying 
copyright — providing incentives to original authors and fostering 
creativity that builds on prior expression — must be balanced in 
reaching a determination of fairness.131 Because judges routinely 
consider policy implications of their rulings, and because the 
inferences in the four-factor analysis contemplate policy, it might be 
argued that judges are better equipped than juries to draw those 
inferences.  
This argument is questionable. As an initial matter, it is unclear that 
judges are inherently better at deciding policy than are jurors.132 As 
between citizens and judges, the democratic system of government 
values the popular opinion of its citizens (i.e., through the legislature) 
over the opinion of its judges when social policy decisions are 
necessary.133 Although judges may consider policy matters more often 
than citizens, this fact does not imply that judges are better at deciding 
policy matters: ordinary citizens may enjoy a perspective on a policy 
issue that a judge lacks.  
Yet even assuming that judges are better than juries at 
contemplating the policy implications of a fair use decision, policy 
implications are secondary to the central consideration in determining 
fairness — a constitutional mandate to protect fair use as speech under 
the First Amendment. The central consideration in the fair use 
analysis is whether the use should be protected as speech.134 In some 
circumstances, the act of repeating another’s expression should be 
 
judges make); cf. Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under 
the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1160 (2003) (arguing that inferences 
should be classified as legal if they raise questions relating to likely actions of persons 
made aware of litigation outcome). 
 130 See William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, 
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 667-68 (1993) (noting 
“fundamental public policies at stake” in determining fair use). 
 131 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (explaining that policy 
underlying copyright is to provide incentives for authors to create and disseminate 
ideas). 
 132 Cf. McCoy v. Thorn, 451 F. Supp. 351, 352 (W.D. La. 1978) (“Independent 
policy determination by a court violates the principle, embodied in the Constitution 
and proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, that a political sovereign derives 
its power solely from the people.”). 
 133 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) 
(recognizing that courts must defer to legislative view where legislature has spoken, 
and where legislature has not spoken, Court must defer to agency’s view because of 
agency’s “greater familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances”). 
 134 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, 221 (describing fair use as “free speech safeguard[]” 
and “First Amendment accommodation[]”). 
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protected as its own act of speech, and fair use is the doctrine that 
allows for an identification of those circumstances.135 Fair use 
subsumes speech interests that may restrain copyright’s ability to 
suppress a defendant from repeating copyrighted expression.136 If the 
fair user has a speech interest in repeating copyrighted expression, fair 
use is the doctrine through which she may realize that interest.137 To 
be sure, fair use represents a speech-protective doctrine.138 
Because fair use is a speech-protective doctrine, the jury should 
determine whether a use is fair.139 The jury is better suited than the 
judge to identify the speech value underlying fair use expression 
because the ability to identify speech values turns on the ability to 
identify social values and cultural norms of society;140 it does not turn 
on the ability to assess policy implications of particular expression.141 
 
 135 See id.; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-66 (1998) (arguing that copying 
another person’s expression constitutes speech); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, 
Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 
2431, 2433-34, 2466-70 (1998) (arguing for speech procedural protections to apply to 
fair use expression). 
 136 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, 221; Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 
624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair use 
defense.”); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“First Amendment concerns in copyright cases are subsumed within the fair 
use inquiry.”). 
 137 See Chi. Bd., 354 F.3d at 631 (“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair 
use defense.”); Elvis, 349 F.3d at 626 (“First Amendment concerns in copyright cases 
are subsumed within the fair use inquiry.”). 
 138 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, 221. 
 139 Cf. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950) (Jackson, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“It is not the function of our Government to keep the 
citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government 
from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the censors are 
better shielded against error than the censored.”). 
 140 The role of cultural norms and social values in speech theory and doctrine is 
pervasive. The marketplace-of-ideas theory reflects the social value that society has 
placed on truth. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (articulating marketplace-of-ideas speech theory as “best test of truth”). 
The speech theory of human dignity represents the social values that society places on 
personhood. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A 
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.5 (2010) (outlining human dignity theory of 
free speech). The speech theory of democratic self-governance represents the social 
value that society places on a form of government. See generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (explaining 
democratic self-governance theory of free speech). Similarly, exceptions to an absolute 
speech protective doctrine reflect cultural norms as to the types of expression that 
merit protection (e.g., fighting words, obscenity, false defamation).  
 141 Leaving the decision with judges to assess whether a defendant’s use should be 
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Consider expression in another speech context — indecency.142 
Protecting a particular indecent expression may reflect bad policy if 
that particular expression will likely result in undesirable effects: 
showing an adult movie might attract persons who are more likely to 
engage in criminal activity.143 Yet this policy implication is irrelevant 
in determining whether the particular indecent expression merits 
protection as speech.144 The particular indecent expression merits 
protection regardless of its negative policy implication. Its protected 
status derives from its value as speech, which value is based on social 
values and cultural norms.145 Social values and cultural norms 
distinguish indecent expression from obscene expression — the 
former protected and the latter unprotected. Tellingly, the institution 
that the law entrusts to draw this indecent-obscene distinction is the 
jury: the jury identifies whether expression is protected as indecent or 
unprotected as obscene.146 Thus, the jury is better able to identify the 
cultural norms and social values that speak to the presence or absence 
of value in such expression.147  
Just like the distinction between obscene and indecent expression, 
in copyright the distinction between an infringing use and a fair use 
 
protected as speech would place the government in control of a fundamental cultural 
institution for exchanging ideas — the institution of criticism and comment of 
another’s ideas. Such an outcome the law disfavors. See Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 
798, 806 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[T]he government may not pass speech 
restrictions in an effort to preserve its own notions of valued American culture.”). 
Judges deciding whether to protect expression based on policy considerations would 
seem to represent the government acting as “the great censor and director of which 
thoughts are good for us.” See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
 142 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“Sexual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 143 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (recognizing 
reasonableness of city ordinance restricting adult movie theater locations based on, in 
relevant part, intent to prevent crime). 
 144 The fact that policy considerations are irrelevant in deciding whether a 
particular expression should be protected as indecent does not imply that policy 
considerations cannot affect the time, place, or manner of protection generally 
extended to indecent speech. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 54 (permitting zoning 
regulation of adult theaters based on their “secondary effects,” as permissible time, 
place, or manner restriction). 
 145 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (looking to social 
values and cultural standards of lay jurors to determine whether expression 
constitutes unprotected obscenity or mere indecency). 
 146 See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (requiring jury to 
determine community standards for judging whether expression merits speech 
protection in obscenity context); Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.  
 147 See sources cited supra note 146. 
  
510 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:483 
turns on whether the use has value as speech.148 And like indecent 
speech, the speech value of fair use expression is determined by social 
values and cultural norms.149 With its broader array of life experiences, 
the jury includes the views of several jurors, reflecting social values 
and cultural norms of society better than the singular nature of a 
judge’s views — in the contexts of both indecent and fair use 
speech.150 
Thus, the fact that a judge may, and a jury may not, recognize policy 
implications of inferences in the four-factor analysis should not be the 
basis for choosing between judge and jury. That a judge is best able to 
assess the policy implications of providing incentives to authors does 
not imply that a judge is best able to identify the speech value 
underlying fair use expression. In the fair use analysis, an ability to 
assess social values and cultural norms is more valuable than an ability 
to assess policy implications. Speech protection matters more than 
policy consideration.151 As the institution best able to identify relevant 
social values and cultural norms, the jury should decide the issues in 
the four-factor analysis. 
b. Legal Consistency 
A second argument for judges to decide fair use issues is that judges 
would provide consistency and certainty in the law of fair use.152 
 
 148 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair 
use doctrine.”). 
 149 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 150 It is of course possible that the speech nature of fair use might require a judge 
to protect a defendant’s use from the jury. A role of judges is to protect unpopular 
views from majority censorship. Where jurors discriminate against fair use expression 
based on their disagreement with the expression’s content — rather than 
considerations of fairness, i.e., the four factors — the jurors represent a majority 
seeking to silence unpopular speech. In that circumstance, the constitutional 
obligation of the judge to protect a minority’s constitutional right of free speech 
should enable the judge to rule for the defendant as a matter of law. This Article, 
however, addresses only the general question of whether fair use represents a question 
of fact or law for the jury or judge, absent extraordinary circumstances. In a 
forthcoming article, the Author will explore such circumstances where judges may 
decide fair use as a matter of law.  
 151 Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (“[T]he 
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the 
table.”). 
 152 Cf. Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 135, at 2442-44 (arguing that issues of 
substantial similarity in copyright law should be determined as matter of law at trial 
and on appellate review based on “refinement of the legal standard”). 
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Rulings on issues of law create binding precedent.153 Consequently, if 
fair use issues were issues of law, their resolution by judges would 
create precedent, ensuring certainty with regard to subsequent 
conduct. By contrast, if these issues were deemed factual for a jury, 
one jury could deem a certain use fair, whereas another jury could 
find the same use to be infringing.154 The state of fair use law would 
seem to lie in disarray: whether a use was fair could be anyone’s guess. 
For the sake of consistency and certainty, then, these issues should 
arguably be legal, and thus, reserved for judges to decide.155 
This basis for favoring judges over juries is not altogether 
persuasive. With regard to novel uses of copyrighted expression, 
uncertainty will continue to abound regardless of which institution 
decides the issue.156 Judges bring no greater certainty to yet-
undecided, novel questions of fair use than do juries. Indeed, during 
the last few decades in which judges have treated fair use as a legal 
question, the doctrine has become ever more uncertain and 
unpredictable.157 Simply put, judges do not share a consensus view on 
 
 153 See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214-15 (8th ed. 2004) (defining both 
precedent and binding precedent). 
 154 Elementary notions of justice suggest that if society deems a type of behavior as 
permissible today, then absent notice otherwise, society should deem that same type of 
behavior as permissible tomorrow. See HOLMES, supra note 68, at 123-24 (arguing that 
similar facts should give rise to same normative judgment, suggesting legality of issue). 
 155 This argument draws support from another intellectual property area — patent 
law. The Supreme Court has recognized that issues of claim construction in patent law 
should lie with the judge for the sake of legal consistency. Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996). By placing claim-construction issues 
with a judge, the law provides certainty to future inventors as to whether a similar 
product constitutes a non-infringing advancement or an infringing equivalent. The 
legal nature of the issues demarcates certain boundaries of inventions, ultimately 
giving rise to increased productivity in the marketplace of inventions. 
 156 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that 
fair use requires case-by-case analysis); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (describing process of determining whether use is fair as “the 
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle and 
refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent”); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing 
World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 133, 134 (2003) (discussing “indeterminacy” of 
fair use judgments); Leval, supra note 24, at 1106-07; David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them 
All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 278-84 (2003) 
(demonstrating unpredictable nature of fair use doctrine through means of statistical 
analysis). 
 157 See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 41, at 1496 (observing that judicial 
attempts to define fair use “have failed unconditionally” and that “hope that a 
common understanding would emerge over time did not materialize”).  
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the meaning of fairness.158 Fair use as an issue of law begs for as much 
clarity as fair use as an issue of fact. 
With regard to uses that are not novel, the certainty argument is 
stronger. Assuming a sufficiently similar use, a litigant could predict 
whether her use was fair based on past judicial decisions. For instance, 
case law has well established that recording a television show on a 
VCR159 and displaying thumbnail images on a search-engine site are 
fair uses;160 likewise, case law has well established that sharing music 
files through peer-to-peer networks is not a fair use.161 Treating the 
issues as a matter of law would, therefore, seem to provide certainty to 
future users as to the fairness of the use. 
The primary function of the fair use doctrine protection of speech 
— protection of speech — diminishes the strength of the above 
argument. The speech-protective function of fair use requires that 
each particular use under consideration be decided on its own 
merits.162 Indeed, it is a fundamental tenet of fair use that each use in 
question raises its own consideration of fairness; each use potentially 
raises circumstances that might raise an element of speech requiring 
protection as a fair use. Case-by-case consideration ensures that no 
circumstance is overlooked that might justify characterizing a 
defendant’s repetition of expression as the defendant’s own act of 
speech.163 Through this case-by-case application, inferences drawn in 
the four-factor analysis necessarily lack precedential value.164 Thus, 
 
 158 As Judge Leval observed in his landmark law review article, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard:  
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions 
provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are 
commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning 
of fair use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem 
rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.  
Leval, supra note 24, at 1105-07.  
 159 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984). 
 160 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 161 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 162 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
 163 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as 
“free speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation”). 
 164 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) 
(explaining that each fair use case “must be decided on its own facts”); Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (“[A]s soon as 
literal appropriation ceases to be the test [for copyright infringement], the whole 
matter is necessarily at large, so that, as what recently well said by a distinguished 
judge, the decisions cannot help much in a new case.”). 
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the case-by-case nature of the fair use inquiry necessarily limits the 
implication of inferences drawn in any particular case: inferences 
drawn in one case are not binding on a subsequent case.165 In short, 
the speech nature of fair use implies that the doctrine necessarily 
should be somewhat limited in its precedential effect; it is intended to 
be somewhat unpredictable.166 
Of course this case-by-case principle does not imply that previous 
fair use opinions are entirely irrelevant in future fair use cases. For 
instance, the Supreme Court’s teaching in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. on the fairness of recording a television 
show through home-use VCR technology must be relevant in deciding 
similar cases.167 Fair use opinions may establish principles as a matter 
of law to guide the fair use analysis, and at the same time, the issue of 
fair use may remain an issue of fact for a jury. Appellate courts may lay 
down general principles to teach future factfinders the correct 
methodology for finding facts in similar situations, and trial courts 
may provide legal instructions that guide juries.  
In this manner, the relationship between judge and jury in fair use is 
akin to the same relationship in takings law in that both the inquiry 
into whether a use is fair and the inquiry into whether a government 
act amounts to a taking represent ad hoc factual inquiries.168 Appellate 
opinions are not binding on decisions of lower courts with regard to 
the particular findings of future factfinders; yet appellate opinions may 
provide binding legal instruction as to the methodology for the 
 
 165 Just as yelling “fire” is permissible in some circumstances but not in others, so 
also is copying an expression of a copyright holder permissible in some circumstances 
but not in others. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, 
J.) (“[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”), with Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (“What would be a ‘fair use’ in one case might not be in 
another.”). 
 166 Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.9 (1973) (noting that even if juries 
may reach different conclusions as to whether expression merits speech protection in 
obscenity context, constitutional rights are not abridged because “one of the 
consequences we accept under our jury system” is that “different juries may reach 
different results”). 
 167 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 
(1984). Would the holding of Sony apply to recording television shows on a Digital 
Video Recorder? See Ned Snow, The Tivo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate 
Copyright Law, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 81-83 (2005) (contemplating distinction 
between recording television show on DVR and VCR that suggests copyright 
infringement despite Sony holding). 
 168 See infra note 169. 
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factfinding process.169 In this regard, the verbiage of legal instruction 
— in either an appellate opinion or a trial jury instruction — may 
suggest the fairness of a use in question. For example, the Supreme 
Court declared in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that to the extent a 
use transforms its underlying work, other factors in the analysis that 
suggest against fairness should be considered less significant than they 
otherwise might be considered.170 Based on this declaration, a trial 
judge might instruct the jury as follows: “The extent to which the 
defendant’s use is deemed transformative of the plaintiff’s work will 
decrease the significance of factors tending to suggest infringement.” 
Such an instruction would provide a general guideline for the jury, but 
it would not bind the jury to find a particular expression to be fair, nor 
would it even bind them to weigh heavily the transformative factor.171  
On the other hand, an appellate court’s opinion may provide much 
more specific teaching on how a factfinder should weigh factors in the 
analysis under specific circumstances. Consider the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
 169 The fair use analysis represents an ad hoc inquiry. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (analysis of fair use claim must be made on 
case-by-case basis); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 
(2d Cir. 1960) (test for infringement of copyright is necessarily “vague” and 
determinations must be made “ad hoc”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (1990), 
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953 (“[T]he doctrine of fair use . . . requires ad hoc 
determinations.”). The takings analysis also represents an ad hoc inquiry, where 
appellate decisions are not binding on decisions of lower courts with regard to the 
particular findings that are made, but they do provide binding legal instruction as to 
the methodology for making the findings. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1005 (1984) (“The inquiry into whether a taking has occurred is essentially an 
‘ad hoc, factual’ inquiry. The Court, however, has identified several factors that should 
be taken into account when determining whether a governmental action has gone 
beyond ‘regulation’ and effects a ‘taking.’ ”). 
 170 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579:  
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether and to what 
extent the new work is “transformative.” Although such transformative use is 
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of 
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, 
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. 
(citations and footnotes omitted). 
 171 See PATRY, COPYRIGHT, supra note 116, § 10:60. Even after Campbell, judges 
themselves (without reserving the issue for a jury) have found a use to be 
transformative yet reached a conclusion that the use was not fair. E.g., Castle Rock 
Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (admitting transformative nature of defendant’s use, but 
finding use to be unfair).  
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decisions in Kelly v. Arriba and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, both of 
which provided legal instruction as to how to perform the factfinding 
process in the four-factor analysis where a defendant has produced a 
copyrighted work on a search engine.172 In both cases, the court held 
that the transformative nature of the thumbnail image required a 
finding of fairness.173 Consequently, in a future thumbnail-image case, 
a court might find that a reasonable jury could reach no other finding 
but that the use is fair. For on two occasions, the Ninth Circuit’s 
specific instruction about the proper methodology for interpreting and 
weighing the fair use factors in the particular situation where a 
defendant displays thumbnail images through a search engine seemed 
to leave no room for a reasonable factfinder to reach any conclusion 
other than that such a use of thumbnail images must be fair.174 In such 
an instance, where an appellate court’s legal instruction is specific 
with regard to a particular situation, summary judgment would be 
appropriate: no reasonable jury could find otherwise given the legal 
instruction from an appellate court. 
Certainty for future uses that resemble past uses may, therefore, be 
achieved where an appellate court chooses to articulate specific 
instruction that should guide a particular situation. Where the 
appellate court determines that specific circumstances should trigger a 
finding of fairness as a matter of law, or perhaps determines merely 
that those circumstances should trigger an interpretation and weight 
of a particular factor, trial courts become bound to make the 
appropriate finding of fact.175 But absent such legal instruction, the 
finding of fact remains an open question. The certainty that appellate 
courts may provide to future uses will depend, ultimately, on the 
language that those courts employ to define the scope of the use and 
to articulate the methodology of the analysis. For instance, the 
language of Sony appears to leave no room to interpret recording a 
television show on a VCR for home use as anything but a fair use,176 
 
 172 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 173 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 719-25; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817-22.  
 174 Perhaps, however, there is room for a finding of infringement. In both cases, the 
court left open the possibility that commercial harm to the plaintiff might result in a 
different finding. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 719-25; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817-22. 
 175 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-85, 588, 592-93 (establishing that 
circumstances suggesting parodic nature of use should weigh heavily in favor of 
finding fairness); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-
55 (1984) (establishing that recording television shows for home use is fair as matter 
of law). 
 176 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-55. 
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whereas the language of Campbell appears to leave ample room to 
interpret the reproduction of lyrics in a song as either fair or 
infringing.177 The jury decides questions left open by the legal 
principles that appellate courts set forth. 
It should further be noted that treating fair use as a factual issue 
does not limit the ability of appellate courts to provide legal 
instruction. Consider again appellate cases in takings law: they 
demonstrate that appellate courts have ample opportunity to articulate 
principles that should guide the ad hoc factual inquiries of the trial 
courts.178 Moreover, the doctrine of independent review obligates 
appellate courts to employ de novo review of factual findings that 
affect litigants’ constitutional rights,179 and fair use affects defendants’ 
right of speech.180 So a verdict that denies fair use affects the 
defendant’s speech rights, thereby obligating appellate courts to apply 
independent de novo review to ensure that those rights are not 
violated.181 Hence, construing fair use as an issue of fact for a jury does 
not imply any less certainty in the judge-made law of fair use. 
 
 177 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (“While we might not assign a high rank to the 
parodic element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could 
be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.”). 
Compare id. (recognizing potential for fair use of rap artist’s use of plaintiff’s song, 
Pretty Woman), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 
(6th Cir. 2009) (upholding jury verdict finding infringement, rejecting fair use, 
despite “small elements of [plaintiff’s funk] song” being used in defendant’s hip hop 
song and distinction between song markets of plaintiff and defendant). 
 178 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). 
 179 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984) 
(requiring judges to perform independent review where constitutional liberty, such as 
speech, turns on ultimate finding of fact). 
 180 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as 
“free speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation[],” and suggesting 
First Amendment violation if Congress altered “traditional contours” of copyright law). 
 181 Professor Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell argue that the trial court should 
perform independent review in copyright cases on summary judgment. See Volokh & 
McDonnell, supra note 135, at 2443-44. They argue in the context of the substantial-
similarity issue that the trial judge should decide the issue at summary judgment 
under the principle of independent review. See id. Why wait for the appellate court to 
review if the trial court already observes a constitutional liberty that needs protecting? 
This argument seems to have merit in the fair use context, but only insofar as a 
constitutional right needs protecting — the very basis for applying independent 
review. In fair use, the only constitutional right that needs protecting is the 
defendant’s right to speak, for the copyright holder’s right to speak is not threatened 
by removing an incentive. Hence, it seems plausible for trial courts to perform 
independent review on summary judgment, but only to protect the speech right of the 
defendant. Under this reasoning, it would seem permissible to treat fair use issues as 
legal for a judge to decide only where the defendants’ constitutional right of speech 
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c. Jury Incompetency 
It might be argued that judges, rather than juries, should decide 
these issues on the ground that juries are incompetent at deciding fair 
use issues. The incompetency argument is twofold: first, the jury may 
lack experience in analyzing fair use issues; second, the jury may be 
partial to defendants. With respect to the first incompetency 
argument, the average juror likely has no experience in applying legal 
principles of the fair use doctrine. That inexperience might deprive the 
juror of insight necessary to perform the intellectual rigors of the fair 
use analysis. With respect to the second incompetency argument, it is 
possible that jurors may be partial to defendants because the jurors 
might benefit from a finding of fair use. For instance, if jurors were to 
find that uploading music files onto a peer-to-peer file-sharing 
network was a fair use, those very jurors would benefit from their own 
finding because such a verdict would allow them to download the very 
files at issue. Relatedly, a juror may be unable to appreciate the social 
value of protecting monopoly rights of copyright holders who are large 
corporations, especially where those corporations are suing common 
individuals. The average juror, then, may lack competency from the 
standpoint of experience and impartiality. 
These two criticisms against jurors do not appear sufficient to prefer 
judge over jury. With regard to experiential competency, it is 
questionable whether experience or familiarity with the law of fair use 
provides any advantage in drawing the inferences.182 In assessing an 
expression’s meaning, life experiences seem more valuable than legal 
experiences.183 Moreover, the history of reversals and dissents in 
judicial opinions on fair use suggests that jurors could not be any less 
capable than judges at drawing the inferences.184 With regard to 
 
merits protection: only then would summary judgment be appropriate for defendants 
as a matter of law. It would not be appropriate for the plaintiff, however. Such an 
outcome would be analogous to the procedure employed in defamation law, where 
courts never entertain a motion for summary judgment for a defamation plaintiff, but 
do recognize the importance of summary judgments for defamation defendants. See, 
e.g., DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267 (N.J. 2004) (recognizing appropriateness 
of summary judgment for plaintiff). This possibility will be developed further in 
another article by the Author. See discussion infra note 150. 
 182 See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 157, 158. 
 183 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 184 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) 
(reversing appellate court’s reversal of district court’s finding of fair use on summary 
judgment); On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing district 
court’s summary judgment ruling that defendant’s use was fair); Worldwide Church of 
God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).  
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impartiality, it is a dubitable assumption that judges are any less 
influenced by personal biases and habits than are jurors.185 
Furthermore, the contention that juries will impartially favor 
individuals over corporations is, as an empirical matter, simply 
unsupported.186 As a general matter, juries appear to rule just as 
favorably for large corporations as they do for individuals.187 Thus, 
jury incompetency does not seem a reasonable basis for preferring 
judge over jury.  
III. THE HISTORY OF JURIES IN FAIR USE 
For over two centuries, fair use was an issue of fact for the jury 
when cases arose in common-law courts.188 As far back as the mid 
1700s, the issue in a common-law court consistently rested with juries 
— not judges.189 And for two hundred years that followed, those 
common-law courts consistently upheld the tenet that juries decide 
issues of fair use.190 In the recent past, however, courts have begun to 
 
 185 That judges’ personal habits might create a conflict of interest that influences 
their judgment, even if unintentionally so, seems a practical reality — even for the 
most respected of judges. See also discussion infra Part IV.A.2.b (positing that 
personal biases of judges may influence their judgment in fair use cases). Compare 
United States v. U.S. District Court, 858 F.2d 534, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, 
J.) (recognizing mistake-of-fact defense for producer of obscenity where federal statute 
required strict-liability punishment), with Scott Glover, Judge Alex Kozinski Recuses 
Himself from Obscenity Trial, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at B-1 (explaining Judge 
Kozinski’s admission that he views and posts pornographic material to Internet and 
reporting that this fact caused Judge Kozinski to recuse himself from considering 
obscenity appeal).  
 186 See, e.g., Jury Verdict Form at 17-20, Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-
cv-1497 (MJD/RLE) (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) (expressing jury verdict of $1.92 
million fine for defendant’s copyright infringement by downloading twenty-four 
songs); see also Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of 
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 352-53 (1998) (concluding through 
empirical study that jurors do not disproportionately favor individuals over 
corporations). 
 187 See sources cited supra note 186. 
 188 Of course this is not to say that copyright suits, along with the issue of fairness, 
arose only in actions at law. As Professor Gómez-Arostegui aptly points out, copyright 
suits arose in equity before they arose at law. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What 
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law 
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1222-23, 1273 (2008) (explaining copyright 
suits that arose in courts of chancery after 1660 and copyright suits in courts of law 
after mid 1700s). 
 189 See cases cited supra note 1; discussion infra Part III.A. 
 190 E.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds that 
“[t]he four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are 
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ignore this tenet, ultimately leading to judges now treating fair use as a 
pure issue of law: judges now decide fair use on summary judgment 
regardless of whether reasonable minds may disagree on the inferences 
to be drawn in the four-factor analysis.191 
A. The First Two Hundred Years  
1. English Common Law 
Fair use traces its roots to the inception of copyright. As early 
English courts of law shaped the contours of the copyright doctrine, 
they necessarily shaped the contours of non-infringing copyright uses, 
what today is fair use.192 As early as 1769, those early English cases 
indicate that the issue of whether a use infringes a copyright, or 
alternatively whether the use is fair, should lie with a jury.193 One early 
 
normally questions for the jury”); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 
1977) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds 
that “determination whether the use under these circumstances was substantial should 
have been made by the trier of fact in the light of all relevant facts”); Arnstein v. Porter, 
154 F.2d 464, 472-74 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting idea of deciding fair use on summary 
judgment); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1143-47 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying summary judgment on grounds that “the applicability of the 
fair use defense is ordinarily a factual question for the jury to determine”), aff’d, 672 
F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(deciding that treating fair use on summary judgment would be premature); see also 
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Summary 
judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts have been 
reluctant to make subjective determinations . . . .”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 138, at 599-600 (1976) (opining that issue of fair use presents questions 
of fact and, thus, should not be determined on summary judgment).  
 191 See cases cited supra note 4. 
 192 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-18 (2d ed. 
1995) [hereinafter FAIR USE PRIVILEGE] (tracing history of fair use). 
 193 In Millar v. Taylor, Justice Aston described “many circumstances” that could 
defeat a copyright action, and explained that the jury would consider those 
circumstances. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 225. No other judge in 
the case took issue with this explanation from Justice Aston. See id. at 201-66. In 
Campbell v. Scott, the court described the jury’s role in an earlier case, Roworth v. Wilkes, 
(1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.) — although the Roworth court did not describe that 
role:  
Roworth v. Wilkes was a case in which 75 pages of a treatise consisting 118 
pages were taken and inserted in a very voluminous work . . . and although 
the matter taken formed but a very small proportion of the work into which 
it was introduced, the jury found for the Plaintiff, who was the author of the 
treatise. 
Campbell v. Scott, (1842) 59 Eng. Rep. 784 (K.B.) 787 (emphasis added). 
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case that articulates this principle is Sayre v. Moore, an action at law in 
1785.194 There, the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, 
sat as the trial judge in a copyright dispute over the defendant’s use of 
the plaintiff’s sea charts.195 The plaintiff had expended great resource 
to create the charts, and the defendant had altered them to create his 
own.196 On these simple facts, Lord Mansfield opined that the case 
raised “a matter of great consequence to the country.”197 He noted 
competing policy considerations in rewarding ingenuity and labor and 
encouraging improvement and progress.198 Then, citing other 
copyright actions (e.g., histories and dictionaries), he summarized the 
general sort of dispute as follows: “In all these cases the question of 
fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or 
not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or 
not.”199 Indisputably then, Lord Mansfield considered the issue of 
whether a defendant’s use was permissibly fair or impermissibly 
infringing to be one of fact for the jury.200 After expressing this, he 
informed the jury that if they believed the defendant’s alterations to be 
“various and material,” they should find for the defendant, but if they 
believed the use to be “a mere servile imitation,” they should find for 
the plaintiff.201 The jury then found for the defendant.202 
Like Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in Sayre, Chief Justice Lord 
Ellenborough in Cary v. Kearsley, an 1803 English copyright case, 
recognized the central role of the jury in deciding the issue of fair use: 
I shall address these observations to the jury, leaving them to 
say, whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted 
from the plaintiff’s book, was fairly done with a view of 
 
 194 Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B.) 138 n.b, 140. Sayre v. Moore 
has well influenced copyright jurisprudence in the United States. Many cases have 
either quoted or relied on Sayre v. Moore to teach principles of fair use or copyright 
generally. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
480 n.33 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1975); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sherriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 
769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 
597 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oaks, J., concurring); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 
1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 195 See Sayre, 102 Eng. Rep. at 140.  
 196 See id.  
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id.  
 200 See id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
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compiling a useful book, for the benefit of the public, upon 
which there has been a totally new arrangement of such 
matter, — or taken colourable, merely with a view to steal the 
copy-right of the plaintiff?203 
Here, it seems undeniable that Lord Ellenborough was contemplating 
principles underpinning the modern doctrine of fair use. Nor can it be 
doubted that he believed the jury to be the appropriate institution for 
deciding that issue.  
But of course not all judges of that era sent the fair use issue to the 
jury.204 Where copyright disputes arose in courts of equity, judges 
would decide all issues, whether legal or factual, because courts of 
equity need not employ a jury to decide issues of fact.205 The right to a 
jury is relevant only where the proceeding arises in a court of law, and 
the test for whether a proceeding arises at law or in equity usually 
turns on the remedy sought — damages or an injunction.206 The 
 
 203 Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680. Modern federal 
jurisprudence continues to rely on Cary v. Kearsley for teaching principles of fair use. 
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Cary 
v. Kearsley (Lord Ellenborough) to delineate principles of fair use); Antioch Co. v. 
Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Minn. 2003) (same); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (relying on 
Cary v. Kearsley to articulate fair use), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Hayden v. 
Chalfant Press, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 303, 312 n.17 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (same). And in 
American copyright jurisprudence generally (outside of fair use), Cary v. Kearsley has 
further proven influential. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 613 
(1834) (relying on Cary v. Kearsley in copyright suit). 
 204 Examples of early English courts deciding the issue of fair use without sending 
it to the jury are the following: Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.) 
453; Amb. 694, 696 (No. 341) (rejecting principle that critical review may supplant 
work itself where defendant had transcribed play and published it in magazine); 
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) 271; Amb. 403, 405 (No. 212) 
(“No certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgment; but every case must 
depend on its own circumstances.”); Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 
(Ch.) 1020; 3 Swans. 672, 681 (“A fair abridgement would be entitled to protection 
[from copyright action of the plaintiff].”). 
 205 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION, 
§ 2.6(2) at 104 (1993) [hereinafter REMEDIES]; 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 31, at 21 (Little, 
Brown & Co., 12th ed. 1877); id. §§ 930–933, at 120-21; cases cited supra note 205. In 
the early fair use case of Gyles v. Wilcox, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, sitting in equity, 
spoke out against using a jury at law to determine whether the defendant had 
infringed. Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490-91. Tellingly, he 
referred to the issue as one of fact. See id. (“The court is not under an indispensable 
obligation to send all facts to a jury . . . .”). 
 206 See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(3), at 106; 1 STORY, supra note 205, § 
31, at 21; 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
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upshot is that because the right to a jury existed only at common law, 
not in equity, juries did not decide all fair uses cases during this era.207 
2. Federal Common Law 
In the United States, the fair use doctrine flourished as courts adopted 
English common law.208 As part of that adoption, early fair use 
jurisprudence in the States — the foundation for the present fair use 
doctrine — relied on,209 and indeed quoted from, the portions of 
English case law that mandated jury consideration of fair use.210 For 
instance, in Emerson v. Davies, Justice Joseph Story211 articulated 
principles of fair use by quoting Lord Mansfield’s admonition in Sayre v. 
Moore: “In all these cases the question of fact to come to a jury, is, 
whether the alteration be colorable or not. . . . [U]pon a question of this 
nature the jury will decide, whether it be a servile imitation or not.”212 
Likewise, in Simms v. Stanton, the court quoted the same declaration 
from Sayre v. Moore, i.e., that the issue of fair use represented a 
“question of fact to come before a jury.”213 Early fair use jurisprudence 
 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 794, at 122 (Little, Brown & Co., 12th ed. 1877) (“[I]t is far 
better that [a damages remedy] should be ascertained by a jury than by the conscience 
of an equity judge.”). This makes just as much sense today as it did centuries ago. 
Consider the present Copyright Act, which contemplates both injunctive and damages 
remedies: the silence brought about by an injunction does not seem as extreme or as 
punitive as the thousands (or even millions) of dollars of debt that a defendant may 
face under the statutory damages provision. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 504(a) (2006). 
And where the remedy represents such an extreme financial penalty, a jury seems 
preferable. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
220-22 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying defendant’s fair use argument on summary 
judgment); Jury Verdict Form, Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (No. 03CV11661-
NG) (awarding $22,500 per Internet use for thirty files downloaded). 
 207 See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(2), at 104. 
 208 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4901) (Story, J.) (relying on English case law in articulating principles of fair use). 
 209 Two early American fair use cases that relied on the English case of Cary v. 
Kearsley were Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 11 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896), and Lawrence v. 
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). 
 210 See, e.g., Simms, 75 F. at 9 (quoting relevant portion of Sayre v. Moore); Emerson 
v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623-24 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.) (same). 
 211 Justice Joseph Story is arguably the jurist who has most influenced the doctrine 
of fair use in the United States. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
575 (1994) (“For as Justice Story explained . . . .”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (relying on Justice Story’s teachings and 
suggesting that he was first to articulate modern principles of fair use doctrine); Leval, 
supra note 24, at 1105 (quoting Justice Story in order to explain doctrine of fair use). 
 212 Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 623-24. 
 213 Simms, 75 F. at 9. 
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in the United States expressly adopted the English common law’s 
approach to reserving the question of fair use for the jury. 
Despite this express adoption of English common law, courts in the 
United States usually did not employ a jury in deciding copyright 
cases involving fair use.214 Although federal case law contemplating 
fair use endorsed juries in written opinion,215 juries in the United 
States were absent in early fair use cases. The reason for their absence 
was simple: early fair use cases, and indeed most copyright cases 
generally, arose in equitable proceedings.216 Any damages under the 
Act at that time were seen as incidental to the equitable remedy of an 
injunction that would prevent continued infringement, and so equity 
was most common.217 Under the now-abolished rule that equitable 
courts may determine legal issues that are incidental to equitable 
issues, courts of equity could determine fair use issues.218 Moreover, 
equity entertained the remedy of an accounting of profits that 
defendants had gained through their infringing use,219 which could be 
greater than the sole remedy afforded by the Copyright Act of 1790 — 
fifty cents in damages per infringing page.220 For many copyright 
holders, lost profits represented the better remedy, so they sought 
relief under a bill of equity rather than an action at law.221 The 
 
 214 But see Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 625 (giving defendant option of having case tried 
by jury). 
 215 See Simms, 75 F. at 9; Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 623-24; cf. West Publ’g Co. v. 
Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1910) (opining that given extent 
of testimony already taken in equitable proceeding before court, it would make no 
sense to transfer case to court of law with jury for plaintiffs to pursue their damages 
remedy, regardless of fact that court of equity has decided to deny injunctive relief). 
 216 See 1 STORY, supra note 205, §§ 930–933, at 120-21 (explaining basis for ruling 
on copyright claim in equitable proceeding). 
 217 See West Publ’g, 176 F. at 838-39 (explaining circumstance wherein equitable 
court could award damages); 2 STORY, supra note 206, § 794, at 122. 
 218 The Supreme Court abolished this rule in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 
470 (1962). After Dairy Queen, federal courts were required to submit all legal issues 
to a jury. Id. at 472-73. If an injunction (an equitable remedy) and statutory damages 
(a legal remedy) are sought, the present Copyright Act requires courts to submit the 
issue to the jury. See id. at 472-73 (“[W]here both legal and equitable issues are 
presented in a single case, ‘only under the most imperative circumstances [such as a 
timely need for adjudication or an improper demand], circumstances which in view of 
the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to 
a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.’ ”). 
 219 See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(3), at 107-08. 
 220 See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (providing remedy 
for infringement in “the sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in [the 
infringer’s] possession”). 
 221 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) 
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equitable nature of the desired remedy precluded any jury 
consideration. 
Actions at law that contemplated fair use, which would call into play 
jury consideration, did not arise in the United States until the 1940s.222 
The reason that copyright holders began to sue at law rather than in 
equity at this time may have reflected a procedural change introduced 
by the first version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
promulgated in 1938. With the Rules of 1938 came the new, efficient 
means for copyright holders to prevail on their claims — summary 
judgment.223 Summary judgment provided a speedy method for 
adjudication without a plaintiff incurring the expense of the usual 
equitable proceedings.224 According to the 1938 Advisory Committee 
Notes, summary judgment was available for actions at law, suggesting 
that it was not available for bills in equity.225 As a result, in the early 
1940s, three copyright cases involving fair use are recorded in which 
the plaintiffs brought their claims as actions at law.226 
In none of these three 1940s cases did the court employ a jury.227 In 
one case, American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, the court 
dismissed the case through summary judgment.228 It is unclear, 
 
(explaining that in copyright suits, recovery of profits “had been given in accordance 
with the principles governing equity jurisdiction, not to inflict punishment but to 
prevent an unjust enrichment by allowing injured complainants to claim ‘that which, 
ex aequo et bono, is theirs, and nothing beyond this’ ”); id. at 402 (“Both the Copyright 
Act and our decisions leave the matter to the appropriate exercise of the equity 
jurisdiction upon an accounting to determine the profits ‘which the infringer shall 
have made from such infringement’.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 
145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (emphasis added) (“This is a suit for the alleged 
infringement of a copyright, and the usual injunctive relief with an accounting is 
prayed for.”), aff’d, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).  
 222 See Am. Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 
1941); Karll v. Curtix Publ’g Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941); Broadway 
Music Corp. v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). 
 223 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 marked the first 
time in the United States that use of the summary judgment procedure was authorized 
in all civil actions.”). 
 224 See generally 1 STORY, supra note 205, § 31, at 21 (explaining process of judicial 
discovery in equitable proceedings). 
 225 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee note (“[Summary judgment] is now used in 
actions to recover land or chattels and in all other actions at law.”) (emphasis added). 
 226 See Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. at 147; Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 836; Broadway Music, 31 
F. Supp. at 817. 
 227 See Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38 (finding fair use of plaintiff’s song lyrics on 
motion to dismiss, where defendant magazine published them as part of historical 
commentary); Broadway Music, 31 F. Supp. at 818-19 (same). 
 228 See Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. at 147. 
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however, whether the court considered the issue of fair use as a pure 
issue of law or alternatively, as an issue of fact that a reasonable jury 
could decide only one way.229 In the two other cases, the courts did 
not grant the defendants summary judgment under Rule 56; rather, 
both courts granted the defendants a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).230 
This is significant because previous to the Federal Rules of 1938, 
courts could grant motions to dismiss only in equitable proceedings.231 
And the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 12(b) suggest that that the 
1938 Rules adopted the motion to dismiss for its equitable nature 
rather than the legal proceeding of demurrer.232 This suggestion that 
12(b)(6) involved an equitable proceeding might have further 
mistakenly233 suggested to a judge that Congress intended to curtail 
plaintiffs’ right to a jury. 
Other courts contemplating the issue of fair use during the 1940s 
continued to openly recognize the factual nature of the issue.234 In the 
1944 case of MacDonald v. DuMaurier, the plaintiff alleged 
infringement of her copyrighted story and novel, and the defendant 
moved for judgment on the pleadings.235 The only issue on the motion 
was whether the defendant’s borrowing of expression constituted a fair 
use.236 The district court granted the motion, holding that it did 
indeed constitute a fair use; on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.237 
 
 229 See id. 
 230 See Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38; Broadway Music, 31 F. Supp. at 817. 
 231 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee note (expressing preference for 
equitable procedure of motion to dismiss rather than legal procedure of demurrer); 
1912 Equity Rules R.29, reprinted in JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY 
RULES 189 (6th ed. 1929). 
 232 See supra note 231. 
 233 Such a suggestion would have been mistaken because the distinction between 
equity and law continued to turn on the remedy that a plaintiff sought rather than the 
procedure for summary dismissal that a defendant employed. See generally DOBBS, 
REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(3), at 106; 1 STORY, supra note 205, § 31, at 21. 
 234 See, e.g., Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 
1943) (“As fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence in the 
case, so, likewise, is the question of infringement one of fact to be solved by a study of 
the evidence.”); N.Y. Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that “[i]f and when 
‘fair use’ constitutes a defense is to be determined by consideration of all the evidence 
in the case”); cf. Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D. Or. 1940) (“A jury trial was 
waived by the parties . . . . Whether the trail [sic] was at law or in equity is thus 
extremely technical, since the procedure of the new rules was used in all other matters 
and the judge heard the evidence by consent of all parties.”). 
 235 MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 144 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 236 Id. at 700-01. 
 237 See id.  
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The majority panel of the Second Circuit (Judge Learned Hand and 
Judge Swan) expressed concern that unconscious influences might 
affect a judge’s view of the fair use issue, which would deny litigants 
their right to a jury.238 
The 1946 decision of Arnstein v. Porter is also notable.239 There, the 
pro se plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed his 
copyrighted song.240 The district court found his allegations to be 
“fantastic,” and so it granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.241 The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that because the 
plaintiff had sought for damages, the suit constituted an action at law, 
and so the litigants were entitled to a jury.242 The majority panel of the 
Second Circuit (Judge Learned Hand and Judge Frank) examined 
whether summary judgment was appropriate to determine whether the 
defendant had engaged in “permissible copying,” or alternatively, 
“unlawful appropriation.”243 The majority explained that the issue 
turned on whether the defendant had taken from the plaintiff’s work 
that which was pleasing to lay listeners — an inquiry identical to the 
third fair use factor examining the substantiality of the defendant’s 
copying.244 Because of the nature of this inquiry, the majority 
articulated that the case raised “an issue of fact which a jury is 
peculiarly fitted to determine.”245 
Although the Arnstein court did not employ the term “fair use” to 
describe this issue of “permissible copying,” the two doctrines appear 
similar in substance, if not distinct in name only.246 Yet regardless of 
any distinction between the two doctrines, courts eventually construed 
Arnstein as prohibiting summary judgment in copyright cases 
 
 238 See id. at 701. 
 239 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 240 Id. at 467. Plaintiff, Ira Arnstein, is characterized as an eccentric and deranged 
songwriter. Although his songs never found popular fame, he filed five separate 
lawsuits against popular recording studios and composers, alleging plagiarism of his 
musical work. All were unsuccessful. Arnstein struggled financially during this time. 
See Cary Ginell, The Strange Case(s) of Ira Arnstein, Serial Litigator, MUSIC REPORTS, 
http://accounting.musicreports.com/smart_licensing/content_article.php?article_id=76
&title=The+Strange+Case(s)+of+Ira+Arnstein%2C+Serial+Litigator (last visited Nov. 
12, 2010).  
 241 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469. 
 242 Id. at 468. 
 243 Id. at 472-73. 
 244 Id. at 473. 
 245 Id.  
 246 See id. at 468, 472-73. The majority did, however, rely on the landmark fair use 
case of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.), in 
its analysis. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472 n.18. 
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generally. Indeed, courts — even outside of copyright — came to see 
Arnstein as forbidding summary judgment except in only the most 
extraordinary circumstances, those where there was not even “the 
slightest doubt as to the facts.”247 Several years later, the influence of 
Arnstein’s summary judgment prohibition weakened: subsequent 
courts rejected Arnstein’s prohibition to the extent that it precluded 
even the usual standard that allows summary judgment where no 
reasonable jury could find otherwise.248 Nevertheless, despite this 
curtailment of Arnstein’s forceful prohibition of summary judgment, 
Arnstein’s general proposition remains intact, i.e., that copyright raises 
issues of fact peculiarly fitted to a jury.249 
In the decade following Arnstein, there are no recorded opinions of 
courts employing summary means to decide copyright cases that 
involved fair use. Only two recorded cases arose where litigants moved 
for summary judgment in actions involving fair use.250 In both cases, 
the courts quickly dismissed the motion.251 Not until 1963252 did the 
first decision arise in which a court granted a motion for summary 
 
 247 See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1967) 
(relying on Arnstein for quoted proposition in copyright suit); Armco Steel Corp. v. 
Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960) (relying on Arnstein for quoted 
proposition in breach-of-contract suit); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (framing summary 
judgment as turning on whether “there is the slightest doubt as to the facts”). 
 248 See Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing 
copyright infringement suit) (“Arnstein, which held that a grant of summary judgment 
is improper whenever there is the slightest doubt as to the facts, is no longer good 
law.”); Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(discussing insurance settlement agreement dispute) (“Although for a period of time 
this Circuit was reluctant to approve summary judgment in any but the most 
extraordinary circumstances, see, e. g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 
1946), that trend has long since been jettisoned in favor of an approach more in 
keeping with the spirit of Rule 56 . . . .”). 
 249 See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(granting summary judgment for defendants in copyright suit yet citing Arnstein for 
proposition that “[s]ummary judgment historically has been withheld in copyright 
cases because courts have been reluctant to make subjective determinations . . .”). 
 250 See Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Winwar v. 
Time, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 629, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
 251 See Thompson, 94 F. Supp. at 454 (relying on Arnstein to deny plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment on grounds that “the defendant may possibly have raised 
triable issues by this defense of fair use”); Winwar, 83 F. Supp. at 629 (relying on 
MacDonald v. DuMaurier and Arnstein for proposition that “the facts relating to the 
alleged ‘fair use’ should be determined upon trial of these issues”). 
 252 Cf. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 199 F. Supp. 860, 861 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (concluding, on summary judgment, that plaintiff’s expression was 
not copyrightable, and so disposing “of what would, on the issue of infringement, be 
questions of fact, viz., whether the defendant’s use was ‘fair use’ ”). 
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judgment that involved fair use: Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.253 
There, the court’s description of the plaintiffs’ infringement arguments 
suggests that the court viewed those arguments as entirely 
unreasonable, which is consistent with the summary judgment 
standard that judges may decide issues of fact if no reasonable jury 
would find otherwise.254 The court, therefore, granted summary 
judgment for the defendant on most of the plaintiffs’ claims.255 
Notably, though, the court did find triable issues of fact where the use 
of the work was not clearly fair.256 
Thus, from the outset of the fair use doctrine in the mid-1700s to 
the mid-1900s, fair use represented a triable issue of fact for a jury.257 
In actions at law, courts routinely described and treated fair use as 
raising an issue of fact for a jury rather than a pure issue of law for a 
judge.258 
B. Decades of Disarray: 1970s and 1980s 
In 1968, the first recorded case arose where fair use was treated as a 
pure issue of law: Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.259 There, 
District Judge Wyatt ruled for the defendant on summary judgment.260 
The plaintiff, Time Inc., held copyrights in the Zapruder film of 
President Kennedy’s assassination; the defendant had copied frames 
from the film to produce a book about the event.261 In ruling for the 
defendant, Judge Wyatt did not find that a reasonable jury could only 
 
 253 Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 911, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff’d, 329 
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). In Berlin, copyright holders of popular songs argued that the 
publishers of Mad Magazine infringed their copyrights by publishing parodies of their 
songs. 
 254 See id. at 913 (“It is obvious that defendants’ lyrics have little in common with 
plaintiffs’ but meter and a few words, except in two instances which will be discussed 
below. Defendants have created original, ingenious lyrics on subjects completely 
dissimilar from those of plaintiffs’ songs.”). 
 255 See id. at 915. 
 256 See id. 
 257 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 258 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 259 Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(finding fair use of plaintiff’s film frames of President Kennedy’s assassination).  
 260 Interestingly, the defendant did not move for summary judgment; the plaintiff 
did; yet the court entered a judgment for the defendant. See id. at 131, 133, 146. That 
this case was eligible for a jury as an action at law is evident from the fact that the 
plaintiff sought damages and that a jury was requested. Id. at 132-33. 
 261 Id. at 131-32. 
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find that the use was fair.262 To the contrary, he characterized fair use 
as a “difficult issue,” describing the process of applying the fair use 
factors to the circumstances at hand as a “difficult job.”263 He admitted 
an “initial reluctance” to find fair use, but then ultimately held that 
“the balance seems to be in favor of defendants.”264 On the issue of 
market impact, he commented that rather than inferring harm, “[i]t 
seems more reasonable to speculate” market enhancement for the 
plaintiff’s work.265 Hence, Judge Wyatt’s language in his fair use 
analysis demonstrated that he did not apply the usual summary 
judgment standard that permits judicial ruling where a reasonable jury 
could reach only one inference from the evidence. 
Despite his difficulty in reaching a fair use conclusion, Judge Wyatt 
defended his decision to treat fair use on summary judgment.266 A trial 
was not necessary, he explained, because the facts were undisputed.267 
He therefore considered the only factual issues to be those that 
surrounded historical facts, those which were undisputed.268 
Impliedly, Judge Wyatt considered the application-of-law-to-fact 
issues as pure issues of law for a judge to decide.269 And so, in contrast 
to all judges before him, Judge Wyatt decided fair use as a pure issue 
of law.  
Following Judge Wyatt, some courts during the 1970s and 1980s 
treated fair use as a pure issue of law.270 Others granted summary 
 
 262 See id. at 144. 
 263 Id. at 144, 146. 
 264 Id. at 146. 
 265 Id. 
 266 See id. at 133. 
 267 Id. The court also relied on the fact that both the plaintiff and the defendant 
agreed that summary judgment was proper. Id. This reason, which other courts have 
employed to justify summary judgment of fair use, is faulty. See discussion infra Part 
III.D.2. 
 268 See Time, 293 F. Supp. at 133. 
 269 See id. 
 270 For example, in Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1174-79 (9th Cir. 1983), the 
Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s copyright 
infringement claim and, in so doing, rejected the defendant’s argument that fair use 
applied and entered judgment for the plaintiff on summary judgment. The defendant 
had reproduced eleven pages of the plaintiff’s thirty-five-page recipe book for the 
purpose of creating a booklet to be used in her cake-decorating classes. Id. at 1173. In 
its six pages of fair use analysis, the Ninth Circuit never considered whether summary 
judgment was appropriate to draw inferences — inferences on which the reasonable 
mind of the district judge had disagreed. See id. at 1174-79.  
In Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit expressly 
adopted the view that the role of the jury is with respect to only the historical facts — 
not the inferences to be drawn from those facts: “No material historical facts are at 
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judgment under the usual standard that no reasonable jury would find 
otherwise.271 Some did so with seeming reluctance, noting that 
summary judgment was usually not appropriate for deciding fair 
 
issue in this case. The parties dispute only the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from 
the admitted facts. Because . . . these judgments are legal in nature, we can make them 
without usurping the function of the jury.” 
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1531-32 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985), a district court considered whether analyzing the four factors was 
appropriate on summary judgment. The court reasoned that because the parties did 
not dispute the historical facts, the only disagreement arose over the conclusions that 
should be drawn from those facts, so summary judgment was appropriate. Id. at 1532. 
The Hustler district court thereby implicitly held the issues in the four-factor analysis 
to be purely legal. The Ninth Circuit proceeded to affirm the district court’s holding. 
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir. 
1986); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753-54, 757-58 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment that denied fair use on grounds that 
substantiality of copying outweighed parodic nature of use and reciting district court’s 
view that issues for consideration on summary judgment were “purely legal”); 
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(contemplating fair use on summary judgment stating “[a]s no dispute exists as to the 
facts giving rise to this action, but only as to the legal consequences, the Court 
believes this case to be appropriate for summary disposition”). 
Other decisions suggest that courts treat fair use as a pure legal issue rather than 
one of fact based solely on the substance of issue under consideration, where it 
appears that reasonable minds could disagree over the outcome. See Supermarket of 
Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 
1986) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, rejecting fair 
use where defendant had employed plaintiff’s real estate listings in its advertising); 
Schumann v. Albuquerque Corp., 664 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D.N.M. 1987) (granting 
plaintiff summary judgment, denying fair use where defendants broadcasted news 
information while copyrighted songs played in background of on-the-spot reporting); 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 219-20 (D. Kan. 
1987) (granting plaintiff summary judgment, denying fair use where defendant used 
plaintiff’s telephone directory to create another telephone directory), rev’d on other 
grounds, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300-03 (D.D.C. 
1985) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment despite fair use argument 
where defendant quoted excerpts of already-published diary entries of plaintiff); DC 
Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 117-19 (N.D. Ga. 
1984) (denying fair use on summary judgment where defendant employed references 
to plaintiff’s copyrighted characters, Superman and Wonder Woman, in skits for 
singing telegrams). 
 271 See, e.g., Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 431 F. 
Supp. 324, 326 (D. Iowa 1977) (finding on summary judgment that fair use could not 
apply and noting that evidence of fair use could lead to only one reasonable 
interpretation). Of course, courts are not always clear on whether they are applying 
the no-reasonable-jury standard of summary judgment, or alternatively, are treating 
the issue as a pure matter of law. See, e.g., Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940, 944 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying fair use to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment, 
but failing to specify whether it did so as pure matter of law or under no-reasonable-
jury standard). 
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use.272 Still others followed the traditional view expressed in Arnstein 
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, fair use was inappropriate 
for summary judgment.273 
During this time period, it is worth noting the positions of the two 
circuits where the majority of fair use issues arise, the Second and the 
Ninth Circuits. In 1978, the Ninth Circuit appeared to have adopted 
the view that the issue of fair use was legal for judges to decide.274 That 
Circuit again appeared to have affirmed that position in 1983 and in 
1986.275 By contrast, the Second Circuit in 1977 and again in 1982 
intimated that summary judgment was especially ill suited for 
deciding fair use.276 Then in 1986, the Second Circuit approved of 
summary judgment for deciding fair use, and in so doing, expressly 
recognized its departure from its own past precedent on this matter.277 
 
 272 In Steinberg, a district court granted a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 
where the defendant argued fair use. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, 663 F. Supp. 
706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Recognizing the law’s preference for a jury to decide the 
issue, the court in Steinberg explained that because both parties had expressly waived 
their right to a jury and because none of the evidence required assessing witness 
credibility, summary judgment was appropriate. Id. Under those circumstances, 
summary judgment would be indistinguishable from a bench trial. See also Quinto v. 
Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 563 (D.D.C. 1981) (granting summary 
judgment for plaintiff and in so doing, noting that “[a]lthough courts are highly 
reluctant to grant motions for summary judgment in copyright cases, this is an 
exceptional case in which summary judgment is appropriate”). 
 273 See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“The four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are 
normally questions for the jury.”); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 
1977) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants and 
stating “[w]hether or not there has been substantial use which would deprive 
appellees of the fair use defense is a decision which must be made by the trier of fact 
after all the evidence has been introduced”); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (relying on Professor Melville Nimmer’s position that “the issue of 
‘fair use’ presents questions of fact and thus should not be determined on a motion for 
summary judgment”); NIMMER, supra note 190, at 600 (describing fair use as “triable 
issue of fact” inappropriate for summary judgment). 
 274 See Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 753-54, 757-58. 
 275 See cases cited supra note 270. The Ninth Circuit did affirm a jury finding 
denying fair use in 1984. See Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
 276 See cases cited supra note 273. 
 277 See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1986). 
Interestingly, in that 1986 case, the Second Circuit narrowed its holding to summary 
judgments for defendants. Id. at 1258. 
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C. Fair Use as a Matter of Law: 1990s and Beyond 
By the 1990s, judges were becoming quite comfortable deciding fair 
use on summary judgment.278 This trend has continued to the 
present.279 Despite past warnings against this practice in the common 
law, judges now treat the issue as entirely appropriate for summary 
judgment, regardless of whether reasonable minds would disagree 
over inferences in the fair use analysis.280 Only a few relics remain of 
 
 278 See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111-12 (2d Cir. 
1998) (ruling for plaintiff on summary judgment, thereby reversing district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for defendant, and commenting that one of factors in fair 
use analysis — weighty factor of market impact — posed “a very close question,” but 
that “[o]n balance,” that factor “tips” toward plaintiff on grounds that defendant failed 
to demonstrate “an absence” of “potential” for market harm); L.A. News Serv. v. 
Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting case law as 
“rejecting argument that fair use is appropriate for determination by summary 
judgment only when no reasonable jury could have decided the question differently,” 
while affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder on issue of fair use); 
Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that fair use decision is improper on motion for summary 
judgment); see also Beebe, supra note 35, at 554 (noting “remarkable increase in the 
prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that began in the mid-1990s and 
has continued to the present”). At least two cases in 1991, however, reflected the prior 
treatment of courts towards the issue of fair use: Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 
F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The fact-driven nature of the fair use determination 
suggests that a district court should be cautious in granting Rule 56 motions in this 
area . . . .”); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(denying motion for summary judgment of fair use issue on grounds that fair use 
“requires a fact-intensive inquiry,” which made it “ill-suited for summary judgment”). 
 279 See cases cited infra note 280. 
 280 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The parties dispute only 
the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts. Because, under Harper 
& Row, these judgments are legal in nature, we can make them without usurping the 
function of the jury.”); see, e.g., Thomas M. Gilbert Architects, P.C. v. Accent Builders 
& Developers, LLC, No. 08-2103, 2010 WL 1804135, at *5 (4th Cir. May 6, 2010) 
(upholding summary judgment for copyright holder where defendant had altered 
architectural designs to construct building); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 
512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing fair use on summary judgment despite 
parties’ dispute over four factors and noting that “it is well established that a court can 
resolve the issue of fair use on a motion for summary judgment”); Zomba Enters., Inc. 
v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary 
judgment for copyright holder on issue of fair use where defendant used copyrighted 
songs in karaoke discs); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 
773-74, 782 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for copyright holder where 
defendant had installed more copies of plaintiff’s computer program onto its 
computers than it had licenses for, despite evidence that number of computers 
running program at any one time never exceeded number of licenses); BMG Music v. 
Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment for 
copyright holder where defendant had downloaded copyrighted music in order to 
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the idea that the doctrine is unsuitable for summary consideration: 
occasionally judges will recite a throwaway line in their opinion to the 
effect that courts should be careful in deciding fair use on summary 
judgment given its fact-intensive nature, only to engage in 
controversial factfinding during their summary analysis of the four 
factors.281 On summary judgment, judges treat the four-factor analysis 
as raising pure legal issues, construing the historical facts as raising 
the only factual matters in the fair use analysis.282  
 
sample songs and determine whether she desired to buy them from retailer, despite 
evidence that her use effected greater profits for plaintiff than plaintiff otherwise 
would have made had she not committed use); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. 
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for defendant and, in so doing, foreclosing defendant 
from arguing fair use to jury, concluding that “[o]n balance, the defense of fair use of 
[the plaintiff’s work] fails” where defendant copied religious text of plaintiff, which 
was no longer in print, and distributed copies to religious followers); Castle Rock 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-46 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming 
summary judgment for copyright holder where defendant created trivia book about 
plaintiff’s copyrighted television show); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 
177, 181, 184-90 (D. Mass. 2007) (granting summary judgment for copyright holder 
where defendant displayed in broadcast portion of photograph of police arrest, despite 
evidence suggesting that use “was for news reporting” purposes, that “the 
photographs [were] factual works,” that plaintiff exercised “minimal authorial 
decision-making to make [the] work,” and that defendant “did edit the photo in a way 
that was arguably more than superficial”); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 
433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238-42 (D. Colo. 2006) (granting summary judgment for 
copyright holder where defendant copied movies to edit out morally offensive content 
and then required consumer to purchase both authorized and edited copies of movie); 
see also cases cited supra note 278. 
 281 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The fact that 
the test envisioned by the [Copyright] Act is dependent on the circumstances of each 
case might suggest summary judgment is unavailable when fair use is the issue, but 
such relief may be granted when appropriate.”); Television Digest, 841 F. Supp. at 9 
(same); Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88-95 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (deciding fair use issue on summary judgment despite its recognition 
that “[c]ourts ‘should be especially wary of granting summary judgment’ in cases 
involving copyright infringement, because they often are highly fact-dependent”); 
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(noting that fair use “is ordinarily a factual question for the jury to determine” and 
then justifying its summary judgment analysis on grounds that facts existed whereby 
it could engage in four-factor analysis), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 282 E.g., Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (rejecting defendant’s fair use argument 
on summary judgment and, in so doing, noting that as to “material historical facts . . . 
the parties are in substantial agreement” and that “the parties’ disagreements are over 
the interpretation of facts,” which “are questions of law” appropriate for summary 
judgment analysis); Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 677 (D. Minn. 
1995) (“[W]hen parties do not dispute the relevant historical facts underlying each of 
the [fair use] factors, courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on the 
basis of the fair use defense”); L.A. Time v. Free Republic, No. CV98-7840-
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An example of a case that typifies this judicial treatment of fair use 
on summary judgment is the 1997 case of Castle Rock Entertainment, 
Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.283 There, the defendant had used 
expressions from the popular television show, Seinfeld, in which the 
plaintiff held a copyright, to create a trivia book about the show.284 On 
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the district judge, now-
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, rejected the defendant’s fair 
use argument.285 She began her analysis by reciting a line of case law 
stating that fair use is ordinarily a jury question, but then justified her 
treatment of fair use on summary judgment on the grounds that 
because the historical facts allowed her to evaluate the statutory 
factors, she could determine the issue as a matter of law.286 She then 
noted the difficulty that the competing inferences presented, 
suggesting the reasonableness of those competing inferences.287 After 
discussing reasons for and against finding fair use in the first factor of 
transformation and the third factor of amount and substantiality, then-
Judge Sotomayor paused to admit that although those factors tipped in 
favor of the plaintiff, she found the plaintiff’s position “hardly 
compelling.”288 On the fourth factor — market impact — Judge 
Sotomayor recognized that the plaintiff’s behavior suggested drawing 
an inference towards fairness: she noted that the plaintiff’s alleged 
plans to create a book like defendant’s amounted to nothing more than 
“a remote possibility” and that the book may have actually increased 
demand for the show;289 she expressly inferred that the book did not 
 
MMM(AJWx), 1999 WL 33644483, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999) (“Fair use is a 
mixed question of law and fact. It is nonetheless appropriate to resolve the issue at the 
summary judgment stage where the historical facts are undisputed and the only 
question is the proper legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts.”). 
 283 Castle Rock Entm’t, 955 F. Supp. at 261-62. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 272. 
 286 Id. at 267. 
 287 See id. at 272 (“[T]here are numerous competing considerations which make 
this decision a difficult one . . . .”). Compare id. at 268 (describing transformative 
inquiry as “central purpose” of first factor, declaring defendant’s use to be 
transformative, and stating that “[i]t may even be said that defendants have identified 
a rather creative and original way in which to capitalize upon the development of a 
‘T.V. culture’ in our society”), with id. at 272 (opining that first factor favors plaintiff 
only by giving meaning of transformation “a generous understanding”). Compare id. at 
269 (noting that defendants used less than four percent of expression from any one 
television episode), with id. at 269-70 (reasoning that amount used was substantial on 
grounds that wherever defendant’s use is sufficiently similar to infer copying, 
defendant will have always taken substantial portion of plaintiff’s work). 
 288 Id. at 270. 
 289 Id. at 271 (“[T]hough plaintiff proclaims plans to enter derivative markets with 
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substitute for, but rather complemented, the show.290 Nevertheless, 
despite these contrary inferences, Judge Sotomayor inferred that the 
fourth factor favored the plaintiff, and thereby ultimately concluded 
that “on balance” the use was not fair.291 In no uncertain terms, Judge 
Sotomayor treated the inferences to be drawn in the fair use analysis as 
close calls. She openly admitted that the “numerous competing 
considerations” made her “decision a difficult one.”292 And close calls 
can be decided on summary judgment only if they arise as pure issues 
of law, not fact.293 Thus, Judge Sotomayor treated the inferences in the 
four-factor analysis as legal rather than factual.  
Noteworthy is the fact that in affirming her opinion, the Second 
Circuit also appears to have treated those inferences as legal.294 Their 
analysis did not defer to any of Judge Sotomayor’s conclusions of 
unfairness.295 Rather, the appellate court merely performed its own 
independent review, implying that fair use was a pure issue of law.296 
D. Reasons for the Present Treatment 
The difference in past and present treatment of fair use on summary 
judgment could not be more blatant. Yesterday, fair use was an issue 
of fact especially suited for juries; today, fair use is a pure issue of law 
especially suited for judges.297 This blatant distinction in treatment 
raises the question of why judges have taken the issue away from 
juries. Several reasons might exist. The most obvious is that judges are 
following a now-widespread practice.298 More subtle, but just as 
controlling, are three other reasons. This section contemplates these 
 
books about Seinfeld, there is little suggestion — and certainly not enough to remove 
all material doubt — that such projects are anything more than a remote 
possibility. . . . [I]f past practice provides any indication, plaintiff will be slow to 
develop any such works [like defendant’s book].”). 
 290 Id. (“The Court agrees; [the book] compliments Seinfeld. The book is only of 
value to a regular viewer of the program.”). 
 291 Id. at 272. 
 292 Id. (“Though there are numerous competing considerations which make this 
decision a difficult one, the Court is persuaded that, on balance, [the defendant’s trivia 
book] does not represent a fair use of Seinfeld.”). 
 293 See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2725, at 410-12. 
 294 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-46 
(2d Cir. 1998). 
 295 See id. 
 296 See id. 
 297 See discussion supra Part I.A–C. 
 298 For a list of cases establishing precedent for deciding fair use on summary 
judgment, see supra notes 278, 280. 
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three reasons: (1) a simple misinterpretation of precedent; (2) faulty 
judicial reasoning; and (3) judicial distrust of juries.  
1. A Misinterpreted Sentence 
Of particular importance to cases that treat fair use as a pure issue of 
law is one sentence in the 1985 Supreme Court decision, Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.299 Judges in the 1990s seized 
upon one sentence from this case to justify their summary treatment 
of fair use.300 The sentence states: “Where the district court has found 
facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate 
court need not remand for further factfinding but may conclude as a 
matter of law that the challenged use does not qualify as a fair use of 
the copyrighted work.”301 Taking this sentence out of context, judges 
interpreted it to mean that the issues arising in the evaluation of the 
statutory factors constitute issues of law.302 As issues of law, these 
issues could be decided on summary judgment, so reasoned district 
 
 299 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
Although not expressly noted in fair use cases, the Supreme Court trilogy of summary 
judgment decisions in 1986 may also have played a role in the increased rate of 
summary judgment decisions during the 1990s. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986). 
 300 See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 
2003) (relying on portion of reasoning from Harper & Row); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 
432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 
Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same), aff’d, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 
1996); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) 
(same); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (M.D. Tenn. 
1991) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 972 F.3d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 
569 (1994). 
 301 See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 302 An example of this interpretation occurs in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.3d at 436. 
There, the plaintiff argued that the jury should decide the issue of fair use. Rejecting 
this argument, the Ninth Circuit quoted the sentence from Harper to declare that the 
Supreme Court had “completely undercut” the plaintiff’s argument. Id. The court then 
opined that under Harper, conclusions in the fair use analysis that must be drawn 
from admitted facts constituted judgments that were “legal in nature” so, therefore, 
where “no material historical facts are at issue,” a judge can determine these 
conclusions “without usurping the function of the jury.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has 
since interpreted its Fisher v. Dees decision as “rejecting [the] argument that fair use is 
appropriate for determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury 
could have decided the question differently.” L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television 
Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 
512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, 
which means that it may be resolved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier of fact 
could reach only one conclusion — but not otherwise.”).  
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court judges. Thus, where historical facts were undisputed, judges 
interpreted the cited sentence from Harper & Row as allowing them — 
rather than the jury — to perform an evaluation of the statutory 
factors.303 This interpretation has today become common.304 
This interpretation is incorrect. The context of Harper & Row 
demonstrates an entirely different meaning. At the district court level, 
the parties waived their right to a jury by electing a bench trial.305 At 
the conclusion of that trial, the court denied the defendant’s fair use 
argument, but in its opinion, the court provided only minimal fair use 
analysis.306 Specifically, the district court failed to draw inferences on 
several factual issues that are material in the analysis: namely, whether 
the defendant’s use was transformative; whether the nature of the 
copyrighted work merited more or less protection as a creative or 
factual work; and whether the amount of the work that the defendant 
had used suggested fairness.307 The few inferences that the district 
court did draw lacked substantive analysis.308  
In such a situation as occurred in the district court’s bench-trial 
opinion of Harper & Row — a failure to articulate factual inferences 
material to the court’s judgment — an appellate court would normally 
vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to articulate 
those factual inferences.309 This rule the Supreme Court had recited 
just a few years prior to Harper & Row, stating: “Where the trial court 
fails to make findings, or to find on a material issue, and an appeal is 
taken, the appellate court will normally vacate the judgment and 
 
 303 See cases cited supra note 300. 
 304 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 12.10[B][4], at 12-190 (contrasting 
older view of factual nature of fair use inquiry with modern view where inferences 
may be determined as matter of law). 
 305 See Harper, 471 U.S. at 543. 
 306 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The extent of the district court’s fair use analysis consisted of the 
following three sentences: 
Assessing the “fair use” factors, I conclude here, too, that none of them 
provide The Nation with the absolution it seeks. First, the article was 
published for profit. Second, the infringed work was soon-to-be published. 
Third, The Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book, and 
fourth, the effect of The Nation’s extensive use of the Nixon pardon material 
caused the Time agreement to be aborted and thus diminished the value of 
the copyright. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 307 See id. 
 308 See id. 
 309 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 n.22 (1982). 
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remand the action for appropriate findings to be made.”310 Under 
normal procedure, then, the appellate court in Harper & Row should 
have vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to 
articulate its factual inferences that constituted material facts in the 
bench-trial judgment. But normal procedure does not apply to an 
appeal of a fair use trial.311 In fair use, if the historical facts are such 
that an appellate court may draw factual inferences that support the 
ultimate finding of the factfinder (be it jury or judge), the appellate 
court may simply affirm the judgment as a matter of law, without 
remanding for further factfinding as to the inferences that the district 
court failed to articulate.312 Stated another way: “Where the district 
court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory 
factors, an appellate court need not remand for further factfinding but 
may conclude as a matter of law that the challenged use does not 
qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work.”313  
Thus, the misinterpreted sentence in Harper & Row merely points 
out that the usual appellate procedure of vacating and remanding a 
judgment where a district court failed to articulate its material factual 
inferences does not apply in fair use.314 If the district court has found 
historical facts sufficient to evaluate the statutory factors, and if it is 
possible to draw factual inferences in that evaluation which support 
the district court’s ultimate decision (i.e., a denial of fair use), then the 
appellate court may affirm that decision as a matter of law.315 Even if 
the district court never expressly stated its factual inferences that 
supported its bench-trial decision, the appellate court can affirm the 
district court’s decision without remanding for factual findings as to 
those specific inferences.316 
It therefore appears evident that the quoted sentence from Harper & 
Row does not mean that the inferences in the four-factor analysis are 
legal. Nevertheless, because this mistaken interpretation has become 
so prevalent among judges as a basis to justify analyzing fair use issues 
on summary judgment — even where those issues present close calls 
— additional comment should be made to dispel any doubt that the 
mistaken interpretation is indeed mistaken. To this end, two specific 
portions of the quoted sentence merit further explication. The first is: 
 
 310 Id. 
 311 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 312 See id. 
 313 Id. 
 314 See id. 
 315 See id. 
 316 See id. 
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“Where the district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of 
the statutory factors, an appellate court need not remand for further 
factfinding.”317 Here the words “need not” and “further factfinding” 
are instructive. They suggest that an appellate court could remand for 
the district court to conduct further factfinding on the statutory 
factors, although the appellate court need not do so. Moreover, the 
quoted portion implies that the evaluation of the statutory factors 
must entail factfinding — and not merely factfinding that makes the 
evaluation possible, i.e., the historical facts — but further factfinding. 
An implication of the quoted sentence, then, is that an evaluation of 
the statutory factors produces further factfinding.  
The second noteworthy portion is: “conclude as a matter of law.”318 
This phrase denotes a process of drawing a legal conclusion. That 
process cannot correspond to the evaluation of the statutory factors, 
for that evaluation involves “further factfinding.” It must instead 
correspond to the process of evaluating whether the district court’s 
decision is sustainable. More specifically, the phrase “conclude as a 
matter of law” refers to the process by which an appellate court 
concludes that the inferences that a district court may have drawn 
during a bench trial are reasonable. “[C]onclude as a matter of law” 
allows appellate courts to assess whether the district court’s inferences 
that it drew in the four-factor analysis are reasonable, and nothing 
more than that. 
Thus, the quoted sentence in Harper & Row does not support the 
current judicial trend of evaluating fair use arguments on summary 
judgment. Contrary to widespread interpretation, the sentence does 
not mean that an evaluation of the fair use factors raises purely legal 
issues. The sentence implies just the opposite — that the evaluation 
raises factual issues. The sentence does not promote, and indeed it 
preaches against, judicial treatment of fair use issues on summary 
judgment. 
2. Faulty Reasoning 
In addition to the misinterpreted sentence from Harper & Row 
discussed above, judges have also employed mistaken reasoning to 
justify summary judgment of fair use. Judges have reasoned that if 
parties do not submit conflicting evidence, the conclusions to be 
drawn from that evidence must be legal.319 That reasoning is flawed 
 
 317 See id. 
 318 See id. 
 319 See, e.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88 
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because the interpretation of undisputed evidence often constitutes an 
issue of fact: that evidence is undisputed does not imply that its 
interpretation is undisputed, thus giving rise to a burden of persuasion 
in the general burden to prove a fact.320 Consider other areas of law: in 
tort, whether undisputed statements constitute defamatory remarks is 
a factual issue;321 in contract, whether undisputed conduct constitutes 
a material breach is a factual issue;322 in property, whether undisputed 
land conditions constitute a nuisance is a factual issue.323 In the 
context of fair use, then, judges are mistaken to believe that only 
issues that admit conflicting evidence may be considered factual 
issues. That historical facts are undisputed does not imply that the 
interpretation of those facts raises legal issues.324  
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (justifying summary judgment decision of fair use on grounds that 
“the likelihood that additional, non-cumulative evidence will be presented at trial is 
slight”); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (labeling historical facts as material facts, and concluding that although parties 
disputed conclusion to be drawn from those facts, no dispute existed as to any 
material facts — especially given unlikelihood that parties would produce any 
additional evidence at trial); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. 
Supp. 1526, 1532 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (justifying summary disposal of fair use issue on 
ground that “the basic, historical facts upon which the fair use issue depends are 
undisputed; the only disagreement is over what conclusion should be drawn”), aff’d, 
796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 320 See generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 563 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 
6th ed. 2006) (explaining factual burden of persuasion as burden to interpret 
evidence). 
 321 See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 746 n.12 (1983) 
(commenting on defendant’s right to jury on “the proper factual inferences to be 
drawn from undisputed facts” in libel suit); Rubin v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 
271 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f an allegedly defamatory publication is 
reasonably susceptible of two meanings, one of which is defamatory and one of which 
is not, it is for the trier of fact to determine the meaning understood by the average 
reader.”). 
 322 See DiPietro v. Sipex Corp., 865 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“A 
breach of contract is material when the breach is of an essential and inducing feature 
of the contract . . . . Whether a material breach has occurred is a question of fact 
ordinarily to be decided by a jury.”) (citations omitted). 
 323 See Jackson v. City of Blue Springs, 904 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“[T]he issue as to whether the condition of their land constituted a nuisance becomes 
a question of fact for the jury.”). 
 324 See Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). In 
Sioux City, the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad company on behalf of a six-year-
old who had sustained injuries on a turntable belonging to the defendant. Although 
the underlying facts were undisputed, the trial judge submitted to the jury the issue of 
whether the defendant acted negligently. Id. at 657-58. The defendant argued that the 
issue should not have gone to the jury because the underlying facts were undisputed, 
so the issue must have been legal for the judge. Id. at 659. The Court rejected this 
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Judges have also reasoned that where both litigants move for 
summary judgment, summary judgment must be appropriate.325 That 
is simply not true.326 Even if both litigants move for summary 
judgment, this fact does not imply that either litigant has waived his 
right to a jury trial in the event that he loses the motion. In moving for 
summary judgment, a litigant waives his right to a jury trial on the 
condition that he win the motion.327 So although both litigants waive 
their respective rights to a jury trial where both litigants have moved 
for summary judgment, both their waivers are conditional on winning 
the motion. The prevailing litigant’s motion for summary judgment 
cannot effect a waiver of the losing party’s right to a jury trial. Judges, 
then, may not infer that both parties have unconditionally waived 
 
argument: 
Upon the facts proven in such cases, it is a matter of judgment and 
discretion, of sound inference, what is the deduction to be drawn from the 
undisputed facts. Certain facts we may suppose to be clearly established 
from which one sensible, impartial man would infer that proper care had not 
been used, and that negligence existed; another man equally sensible and 
equally impartial would infer that proper care had been used, and that there 
was no negligence. It is this class of cases and those akin to it that the law 
commits to the decision of a jury. 
Id. at 663-64. 
 325 E.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing fact that “each party ‘has contended that its case is complete’ 
by moving for summary judgment” as reason to decide fair use on summary 
judgment); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (“[O]ne critical fact distinguishes this case from most copyright infringement 
actions, in which it is preferable to leave the determination of the issue to a jury: each 
party has contended that its case is complete by moving for summary judgment.”); 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1532 (C.D. Cal. 
1985) (justifying summary disposal of fair use issue on ground that “[b]oth parties 
have moved the court for summary judgment”); see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. 
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (reciting district court’s decision to 
decide fair use on summary judgment based on fact that “both parties moved for 
summary judgment, [and] they stipulated that the case be tried on a record consisting 
of their summary judgment submissions and other stipulated and submitted facts”).  
 326 See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“While both parties urge this court to resolve the issue of fair use [on summary 
judgment], the record before us is insufficient to determine fair use as a matter of 
law.”). 
 327 Rule 56 precludes a court from entering a summary judgment if there exists a 
material issue of fact. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). By moving for summary judgment, a 
litigant is representing that no material fact exists that would preclude the court from 
ruling for him. The litigant is not representing that no material fact exists that would 
preclude the court from ruling for the opposing party. Thus, the litigant’s motion for 
summary judgment is conditional upon winning the motion. 
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their jury right where both parties have moved for summary 
judgment. Both parties moving for summary judgment is different 
from both parties agreeing to a bench trial. 
3. Judicial Distrust of Juries 
Another possible reason that judges have taken the fair use issue 
away from juries is that judges simply distrust the jury. One case 
illustrates this possibility. In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, Judge 
Nancy Gertner denied the defendants’ motion for a jury trial on their 
fair use defense, dismissing the defense on summary judgment. 
One sentence from her opinion is revealing: “[Defendants’] demand 
for a jury determination on this issue appears all but standardless; ‘fair 
use’ would, in effect, be any use whatsoever that a jury deemed fair.”328  
Judge Gertner was wrong. Fair use is indeed any use that a jury 
deems to be fair.329 Although the judge may provide instruction and 
guidance, ultimately the jury’s view of fairness carries the day.330 The 
jury draws and weighs the inferences that determine whether a use is 
fair.331 But Judge Gertner could not accept this possibility. She denied 
defendants a jury because if the jury were to find the use to be fair, 
this would constitute a standardless finding, or in other words, a 
finding that was based on incorrect inferences.332 The jury could have 
reached a finding that was contrary to the finding that she believed to 
be correct, and that possibility she could not allow.333 Simply put, she 
 
 328 See Electronic Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Capital Records, 
Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. July 27, 2009) [hereinafter Gertner 
Order]. 
 329 E.g., N.Y. Univ. v. Planet Earth Found., 163 Fed. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“As to the copyright infringement claim, the evidence also supports the jury’s finding 
of fair use, under the four-factored analysis prescribed by statute. While [plaintiff] 
vehemently argues, for instance, that [defendant]’s display of copyrighted material at a 
fund-raiser was of a commercial nature, this issue is the jury’s to decide.”); see also 
PATRY, COPYRIGHT, supra note 116, § 10:60 (“The trier of fact hears all evidence, 
makes factual determinations about the credibility and weight to be given to that 
evidence, weighs all four factors in light of those factual findings, and comes up with a 
judgment based on applying the law to the facts found.”).  
 330 See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 331 See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 332 Tellingly, Judge Gertner’s quoted statement implies that she did not deny a jury 
on the grounds that any reasonable jury would find the use to be infringing; nor on 
the grounds that these issues were pure issues of law; rather, she denied a jury on the 
grounds that a jury could find a use to be fair. See Gertner Order, supra note 328, at 1. 
 333 See id. 
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did not trust the jury to decide the case the way that she believed it 
should have been decided.334 
Such distrust of the jury may arise as a general matter or in the 
specific context of fair use. As a general matter, juries tax a court’s 
schedule and resources. Jury trials are lengthy and expensive for all 
involved, so it is possible that in some instances, judges view juries as 
not worth their cost.335 Juries also represent a significant concession of 
power for a judge.336 Once a jury enters the courtroom, the judge has 
ceded a substantial amount of control in determining the case’s 
outcome. It is possible that some judges would prefer to retain that 
control. 
In the context of fair use, it is possible that judges distrust juries 
because they believe that juries might subscribe to incorrect social 
norms relevant to copyright infringement. It is possible that a judge 
may perceive popular opinion as spurning copyright protection, 
especially with the advent of the Internet.337 From this perspective, it 
 
 334 This quoted statement is not the first instance where Judge Gertner has 
demonstrated her distrust of the jury in the fair use context. In an earlier court filing 
of the same case, Judge Gertner “found cause to consider who is the proper 
decisionmaker on questions of fair use — the judge or a jury.” Order at 1, Capital 
Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. July 14, 2009). In that filing, 
she hinted that she believed fair use is a question “more appropriately decided by a 
judge than a jury.” Id. at 4 n.1. In another case, Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. 
Supp. 2d 177, 181, 184-90 (D. Mass. 2007), Judge Gertner granted summary 
judgment for a plaintiff copyright holder where the defendant had displayed in a 
television news broadcast a portion of a photograph of a police arrest. Despite her 
recognition that the use “was for news reporting” purposes, that “the photographs 
[were] factual works,” that the plaintiff exercised “minimal authorial decision-making 
to make [the] work,” and that the defendant “did edit the photo in a way that was 
arguably more than superficial,” Judge Gertner found that the “balance” of the factors 
favored the plaintiff, awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff, denying defendants 
a jury. Id. 
 335 See Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets 
Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658 (2010) (noting time-
consuming, expensive nature of jury trial amidst system of limited resources). 
 336 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 208-09 (1998) (observing power struggle between judge and 
jury in context of tort law). 
 337 That judges perceive a change in social norms toward copyright infringement, 
as a result of the Internet, is evident in case law. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding peer-to-peer 
downloading to be infringing and noting that by end of year, there may be seventy-five 
million peer-to-peer users), rev’d on other grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Scholars also are alluding to this perception of changing norm. See, e.g., Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 41 
(2000) (observing popular norm that number of peer-to-peer file-sharers makes 
conduct permissible and further observing that courts are momentarily holding with 
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may be unwise to place fair use issues with ordinary members of 
society, who are themselves subject to the pervasive influence of 
Internet norms, because fair use calls for discretionary judgment. A 
judge may believe that the changing norms toward copyright would 
introduce too much wiggle room into fair use, if fair use ever reached 
the jury room.  
These reasons for distrusting the jury are of course only 
possibilities. Whether they actually influence a judge cannot be 
known, especially because that influence may be so subtle that it may 
seem entirely irrelevant to a judge, even while coloring her perception 
of the subjectivity-laden issues. Yet regardless of whether these 
reasons actually do influence the judge, the reasons are an insufficient 
basis for withholding fair use issues from a jury. Distrust of a jury, if it 
occurs for any of the cited reasons, threatens the integrity of the 
judicial system.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS 
The present practice of treating fair use as a pure matter of law for a 
judge to decide raises constitutional concern on two fronts.338 It denies 
litigants’ constitutional right to a jury, and it threatens fair users’ 
constitutional right of free speech. 
A. Right to a Jury 
The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved . . . .”339 Although as a general matter 
summary judgment deprives a litigant of a jury, the Supreme Court 
has articulated that summary judgment is constitutional because it 
merely examines whether an issue exists for a jury to decide.340 But 
 
traditional norms of copyright, rejecting new popular norm).  
 338 See generally Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 135-36 (1937) 
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their 
first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of 
procedure. . . . A little water, trickling here and there through a dam, is a small matter 
in itself; but it may be a sinister menace to the security of the dam, which those living 
in the valley below will do well to heed.”). 
 339 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 340 See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1972) (relying on 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902), for proposition 
that “summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment”); Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1902) (upholding summary 
judgment process on grounds that it merely “prescribes the means of making an issue” 
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Seventh Amendment concerns arise when courts do not follow the 
rules of summary judgment — namely, when courts declare that no 
issues exist for a jury to determine when in fact such issues do exist.341 
More specifically, because the inferences in the four-factor analysis 
constitute genuine issues of material fact rather than pure issues of 
law, drawing those inferences on summary judgment raises 
constitutional concern.342 
1. Fair Use Under Feltner 
In 1998, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for an eight-member 
majority (with a concurrence by Justice Scalia) in which the Court 
found that courts were violating the Seventh Amendment in 
determining damages awards in copyright cases.343 That case, Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., is instructive in the similar copyright 
context of fair use. In Feltner, the plaintiff, Columbia Pictures, owned 
the copyright to television shows that the defendant, Feltner, 
broadcasted on its television station.344 At summary judgment, 
Columbia prevailed as to liability,345 and so Feltner moved for a jury 
trial on the issue of statutory damages.346 The district court denied 
Feltner’s jury demand, awarding statutory damages after a bench 
trial.347 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Feltner argued that the 
denial violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury. 
In considering Feltner’s argument, the Supreme Court recited the 
general guidelines for determining whether a Seventh Amendment 
 
for jury to determine). But see Thomas, supra note 123, at 139 (arguing that summary 
judgment is unconstitutional). 
 341 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1074-1132 (2003) (acknowledging 
constitutional problems on summary judgment that arise in certain circumstances and 
declaring that “if no ‘genuine issue of material fact’ exists and the movant is entitled to 
judgment ‘as a matter of law,’ pretrial disposition does not raise questions of 
constitutional dimensions”).  
 342 See generally 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1762, at 
633 (1833) (describing right to jury as “privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal 
cases, which is conceded by all to be essential to political and civil liberty”).  
 343 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 523 U.S. 340, 342, 353, 355 
(1998). Interestingly, now-Chief Justice John Roberts represented the prevailing 
petitioner, Feltner, before the Supreme Court. Id. at 341. 
 344 Id. at 342-43. 
 345 Fair use was not an issue in any part of the case. See id. 
 346 Id. at 343. 
 347 Id. at 344. 
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violation exists.348 In short, a violation exists where a court denies a 
jury demand as to issues that determine legal rights recognized by the 
common law when the Seventh Amendment was framed.349 The 
disputed rights need not trace their history back to 1791, but they 
must at least be akin to legal rights that existed during that period.350  
The Feltner Court ultimately concluded that the Seventh 
Amendment required a jury trial on the issue of statutory damages.351 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court held that during the relevant 
time period, copyright holders would pursue their legal rights through 
actions at law.352 The Court pointed out that in pursuing the specific 
right to damages, copyright holders would try the issue of damages to 
a jury.353 This history compelled the Court to pronounce that 
copyright holders today must also try the issue of statutory damages to 
a jury — this despite language in the Copyright Act placing the issue 
with the court.354 
Feltner’s holding as to statutory damages in copyright actions 
strongly suggests that the Seventh Amendment also requires jury 
consideration of the fair use issue. Like the issue of statutory damages, 
fair use represents an issue that determines whether copyright holders 
may exercise their legal rights.355 But unlike the issue of statutory 
damages, fair use is more fundamental to the legal right of 
copyright.356 That is, the issue of statutory damages arises only after 
the scope of a copyright holder’s right has been determined, or in 
 
 348 Id. at 347-48. 
 349 Id.; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687, 708-09 (1999). 
 350 Monterey, 526 U.S. at 708-09; Feltner, 523 U.S. at 348. 
 351 Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355. 
 352 See id. at 348-54. 
 353 See id. 
 354 See id. at 345, 355. 
 355 Justice Story explained the role of fair use in determining the legal rights of the 
copyright holder as follows:  
The true question in all cases of this sort [fair use cases] is (it has been said) 
whether there has been a legitimate use of the copyright publication in the 
fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character of a new work. If 
there has been, although it may be prejudicial to the original author, it is not 
an invasion of his legal rights. 
2 STORY, supra note 206, § 939, at 242. 
 356 During the relevant time period, courts viewed fair use as a doctrine that 
defined the scope of rights held by a copyright holder. See Ned Snow, The Forgotten 
Right of Fair Use (Aug. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1659855. 
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other words, only after a defendant’s liability has been determined. By 
contrast, the issue of fair use arises during the very process of 
determining the scope of a copyright holder’s right, or in other words, 
it is the very basis for determining liability.357 Therefore, if the 
Supreme Court views the issue of statutory damages as subject to a 
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, then certainly the Supreme 
Court must view the issue of fair use likewise, for the latter issue is 
more fundamental to the exercise of a copyright holder’s legal rights.  
Like the history of statutory damages in copyright law, the history of 
the common law in copyright actions well establishes that during the 
relevant time period, courts recognized fair use as an issue that 
determines legal rights. Part III.A above has set forth this history. To 
recap, as early as 1769, in the famous case of Millar v. Taylor, English 
common law began teaching that the jury shall consider circumstances 
that would justify copying in order to determine whether a plaintiff 
may prevail on an infringement claim.358 In 1785, the Chief Justice of 
the King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, presided over an action at law for 
copyright infringement, and in doing so, he explained that in deciding 
whether infringement had occurred, the jury would weigh those 
principles that today underlie the doctrine of fair use.359 In 1803, Chief 
Justice Lord Ellenborough also presided over an action at law for 
copyright infringement, and he described the role of the jury as 
deciding whether the defendant’s copying “was fairly done” so as to 
admit no liability.360 Thus, at the time of the Seventh Amendment, fair 
use existed as a jury issue that determined the legal rights of copyright 
holders.361  
Despite this history, a mistaken view of fair use has arisen that fair 
use is a creature of equity and, therefore, not a legal right that existed 
at common law.362 This view stems from the fact that other early 
 
 357 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) 
(Story, J.) (explaining doctrine of fair use as circumstances that determine whether 
infringement lies). 
 358 See Miller v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 224. 
 359 See Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b) (K.B.) 140 (“In all these 
cases the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable 
or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.”). 
 360 Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680. 
 361 See PATRY, FAIR USE PRIVILEGE, supra note 192, at 3-26. 
 362 Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (treating fair use as 
“equitable doctrine”), Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The fair use 
doctrine was initially developed by courts as an equitable defense to copyright 
infringement.”), and Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (describing fair use as “entirely equitable” doctrine), with PATRY, 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 116 § 10:3 (“Fair use is not an equitable doctrine or an 
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judges who articulated the doctrine of fair use sat in courts of equity 
as opposed to courts of law.363 The incorrectness of this view is evident 
from the well-established maxim of equitas sequitur legem (i.e., equity 
follows the law):364 courts of equity must construe legal rights to 
determine whether equity will furnish relief.365 A good example of this 
principle is found in the first American case to articulate the doctrine 
of fair use, Folsom v. Marsh, where Justice Story sat in a court of equity 
and granted the plaintiff’s plea for an injunction against the defendants 
from using the plaintiff’s expression.366 It was necessary for Justice 
Story to construe the scope of the legal right of copyright to decide 
whether to grant the equitable relief desired.367 For that purpose, 
Justice Story articulated the limits of copyright, and that articulation 
has become the current doctrine of fair use.368 Noteworthy is that 
Justice Story did not describe these limits as a doctrine independent of 
or distinct from the right of copyright.369 Indeed, he did not even 
employ any terminology to describe these limits, not even the label of 
“fair use.”370 For Justice Story, considerations of fair use were part and 
parcel with the definition of the legal right of copyright.371 Indeed, in 
 
equitable defense. As history reveals, it is a legal defense which may, and frequently is, 
decided by a jury.”), and Leval, supra note 24, at 1127 (arguing that historically, fair 
use is not creature of equity). 
 363 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136) 
(considering fair use question in equitable proceeding); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (same). Further confusion 
has arisen by the Supreme Court labeling fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” — 
lifting this description from a House Committee Report — in order to emphasize that 
the fair use analysis requires a “sensitive balancing of interests.” See Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-50 & n.31, 454-55 & n.40 (1984) 
(emphasis added). The Court never suggested, however, that this label implied that the 
doctrine arose as an equitable doctrine. See id. To the contrary, the Court expressly 
pronounced that fair use represented a “common-law doctrine,” one that Congress 
intended to codify when it legislated the doctrine into the Copyright Act. Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
 364 See Hedges v. Dixon Cnty., 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (“The established rule . . . 
is that equity follows the law.”). 
 365 See Saunders v. Smith, (1838) 40 Eng. Rep. 1100, 1107 (Lord Chancellor 
Cottenham) (“In all cases of injunctions in aid of legal rights — whether it be 
copyright, patent right, or some other description of legal right which comes before 
the Court [of Equity] — the office of the Court is consequent upon the legal right.”).  
 366 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344-45, 348-49.  
 367 See id.  
 368 See id. 
 369 See id. 
 370 See id. 
 371 See id.; Snow, supra note 356. 
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his commentaries on equity, Justice Story explained: “If there has been 
[a legitimate use of the copyright], although it may be prejudicial to 
the original author, it is not an invasion of his legal rights.”372 Justice 
Story’s articulation of fair use principles in an equitable proceeding did 
not transform the fair use doctrine into a creature of equity any more 
than his articulation of copyright transformed the right of copyright 
into a creature of equity. Ultimately, fair use did not arise as an 
equitable doctrine.373  
Thus, principles of fair use determined legal rights at common law 
in 1791. As a result, issues of fair use fell to the jury. The Seventh 
Amendment requires that they fall to the jury today. 
2. Problems of Denying a Jury 
In 1791, there was good reason for mandating a civil jury. The right 
to a jury was already well established at that time,374 and the Founders 
considered it “essential in every free country.”375 The jury right reflects 
the view that society trusts several citizens to decide a matter 
admitting discretionary judgment more than society trusts a single 
aristocratic judge.376 For like any other position of power, the office of 
judge exposes its officer to subtle but weighty influences that may 
affect impartiality.377 Influences attend the position of judge that are 
less likely to attend the position of juror. The right to a jury guards 
against those influences. Influences on judges that the Seventh 
Amendment was intended to guard against apply as much in fair use 
 
 372 2 STORY, supra note 206, § 939, at 242 (emphasis added). 
 373 See PATRY, FAIR USE PRIVILEGE, supra note 192, at 5 (“It is therefore incorrect to 
characterize fair use as a child of equity.”). 
 374 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 212 (1999) (“By 
the time of Magna Carta the inquest in civil cases was becoming fairly well established 
as the trial jury, although not in criminal cases.”).  
 375 Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV) (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 354, 354 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter Federal Farmer]; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine 
(July 11, 1789), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 69, 71 (Henry A. 
Washington ed., 1853) (“I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet 
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution.”). 
 376 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 375, at 363, 364 [hereinafter Jefferson Letter] 
(observing that jury system “is the only way to ensure a long-continued and honest 
administration of its powers”). 
 377 See id.; STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS 119-20 (2009) (explaining immoral behavior that 
results from position of government power). 
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today as they did in 1791. Two of these influences, improper devotion 
and personal bias, are discussed below. 
a. Influence of Improper Devotion 
Thomas Jefferson advocated the right to a jury because judges might 
otherwise pay improper devotion to separate branches of 
government.378 Certainly neither the executive nor the legislative 
branches may adjudicate a specific legal dispute between two private 
litigants, and so in specific disputes, neither branch should influence a 
judge’s decision.379 For this reason, a devotion to either branch 
threatens judicial impartiality. This devotion becomes especially 
dangerous where the issue raises a constitutional question. Because 
the judiciary (through judge or jury)380 has exclusive authority, and 
indeed an obligation, to decide constitutional questions independent 
of the executive or legislature, a devotion to either of these other 
branches would compromise the judiciary’s duty to decide 
constitutional issues.381  
Fair use exemplifies the potential danger of this improper devotion. 
Fair use raises the constitutional question of whether a defendant’s use 
merits protection as speech under the First Amendment.382 The role 
 
 378 Jefferson Letter, supra note 376, at 364. (“[W]e all know that permanent judges 
acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known they are liable to be tempted by bribery, 
that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the 
Executive or Legislative; that it is better to leave a cause to the decision of cross and 
pile, than to that of a judge biased to one side; and that the opinion of 12 honest 
jurymen gives still a better hope of right, than cross and pile does.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 379 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “judicial power” with Supreme Court 
and courts created by Congress); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS 134 (1973) (observing that “judicial power” of Article III is activated when 
dispute arises between adverse parties). Justice James Wilson, one of the Framers, 
articulated this view as follows: “The independency of each power consists in this, 
that its proceedings . . . should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, 
of either of the other two powers.” JAMES WILSON, 1 WORKS 299 (R.G. McCloskey ed., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1967). 
 380 An example of both the judge and the jury determining whether expression 
merits constitutional protection arises in the obscenity context. The jury receives legal 
instruction from the judge to determine whether expression is obscene, i.e., whether it 
appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive based on community 
standards. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (explaining role of 
jury in obscenity case). 
 381 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) 
(setting forth judiciary’s role of deciding constitutional questions).  
 382 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as “free 
speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodations” and suggesting First 
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that fair use plays in upholding a defendant’s First Amendment rights 
thereby restricts congressional and executive authority to determine 
fairness in any particular copyright case.383 Were a judge to defer to 
executive or legislative suggestion that a certain defendant’s conduct 
was infringing, that deference would compromise her constitutional 
duty to determine whether a defendant’s use constitutes speech.  
An example of such an improper devotion arises in the Clean Flicks 
case discussed above.384 Recall that in Clean Flicks, Judge Matsch 
seemed not to comprehend the reasonableness of a contrary inference 
in the four-factor analysis, ultimately concluding on summary 
judgment that the defendants’ use was not fair.385 During that analysis, 
Judge Matsch relied on a House Committee Report, which was drafted 
two years after the Clean Flicks suit had commenced, and that Report 
indicated a congressional belief that the defendants were committing 
infringing acts.386 Judge Matsch did not conceal the fact that this 
Report influenced his decision.387  
This influence of the legislature on Judge Matsch’s determination of 
fairness is most troubling because that determination represents a 
decision of constitutional import: the judicial system (through judge 
and jury) should have decided whether the defendant’s use merited 
protection as an act of speech. And this decision should have been 
made independent of congressional opinion on the particular facts at 
issue. Judge Matsch’s devotion to the House Committee’s opinion 
about the defendants appears to have affected his impartiality in 
deciding the constitutional issue of fairness.388 
b. Influence of Personal Bias 
The Framers recognized the possibility that a judge’s personal bias 
may influence his decision.389 As the Federal Farmer wrote, where a 
 
Amendment violation were Congress to alter “traditional contours” of copyright law). 
 383 See id. 
 384 See Clean Flicks of Colo. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239-41 (D. 
Colo. 2006); discussion supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 385 See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-41. 
 386 Id. at 1240 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-33(I), at 6-7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225) (explaining that House Committee is aware of services and 
companies that create fixed copies of movies that make imperceptible limited portions 
of audio and video content and that Committee believes such practices to be illegal 
under Copyright Act). 
 387 See id. 
 388 See id. 
 389 Federal Farmer, supra note 375, at 354; see also Jefferson Letter, supra note 376, 
at 364. 
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few hold offices of power, the few are generally disposed to favor 
“those of their own description.”390 Even the most ethical of judges 
may suffer from this failing: indirectly, perhaps even subconsciously, 
the possibility for personal bias exists where one of the parties is 
similar to the judge.391 Without realizing it, the judge may consider 
that party’s view as the most reasonable view because that party seems 
most like the judge.392  
Although this bias is difficult to identify in any given case, the 
circumstance that creates the potential for the bias is not: one party 
looks like the judge.393 That circumstance frequently arises in fair use 
cases. Judges are in many ways similar to corporate copyright holders: 
both represent the educated elite; both stand in positions of power; 
both are sophisticated.394 Compared to a college drop-out or teenage 
 
 390 See Federal Farmer, supra note 375, at 354. 
 391 Scholarship recognizes the presence of implicit or unconscious bias that can 
affect a decisionmaker’s judgment. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” 
and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007) (questioning 
whether presence of unconscious bias based on race, gender, and other legally 
protected characteristics — pervasiveness of which psychological studies have 
demonstrated — affects legally relevant behavior); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1200-01 
(2009) (noting white preference among white Americans and observing that scientific 
studies “reveal implicit or unconscious bias”). Professor Steven Burton has articulated 
the general problem as follows:  
[T]he problem of improper bias can arise also when judges characterize the 
facts in a case. . . . The sifting of evidence is guided at many points by one’s 
general beliefs about how the world works, including beliefs about various 
classes of people. Stereotypical beliefs can generate inferences from the 
evidence to the finding of fact and thereby introduce improper bias in 
adjudication. 
STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 249-50 (1992). 
 392 See generally Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
10, 14 (1987) (“Regardless of which perspective ultimately seems persuasive, the 
possibility of multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows 
how claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims.”). 
 393 See supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
 394 Judge Nancy Gertner aptly observed the disparity between the parties of 
copyright suits during a pretrial hearing involving pro se defendants (who argued fair 
use) and corporate copyright holders: “There is a huge imbalance in these cases. The 
record companies are represented by large law firms with substantial resources. . . . 
They bring cases against individuals, individuals who don’t have lawyers and don’t 
have access to lawyers and who don’t understand their legal rights.” Transcript of 
Motion Hearing at 8, Capital Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. 
June 17, 2008). Noteworthy is the fact that in that case, the copyright holders retained 
the law firm where the judge formerly practiced. An attempt to invoke an unconscious 
bias? See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 5, Capital Records, Inc. v. 
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defendant, the corporate copyright holder looks strikingly similar to 
the judge. Their life similarities of age, education, power, social status, 
and relative wealth become starkly apparent when lined up against fair 
use defendants. These similarities present a danger for bias to 
influence the discretionary judgments pervasive in the fair use 
analysis. The possibility that similarities between copyright holder and 
judge might play into the discretionary nature of fair use cannot be 
denied. 
It should be noted that the danger of personal bias outlined above is 
with respect to the thought process of judges, not the outcomes that 
judges reach. Assuming an ethical judiciary, there is no danger that a 
judge is consciously favoring the copyright holder in order to ensure 
that they prevail.395 Rather, the danger is the temptation to construe 
issues from one party’s point of view, or more specifically, to defer, 
even if implicitly, to a party’s subjective values that control the 
inferences in the four-factor analysis. If a judge must make a 
discretionary determination that admits a wide array of opinion, her 
thought process may tend to mirror those who are most like her. The 
danger here is not that judges are trying to favor one party over the 
other. It is that judges are being persuaded to form opinions and 
exercise discretion for the party that is most similar in circumstance. 
Party similarity in intellect, prestige, or power may subtly influence 
judicial thought processes and discretionary opinions.  
Thus, by withholding issues in the four-factor analysis from juries, 
judges are upending a process for determining fairness that the law 
has developed and maintained since the inception of fair use centuries 
ago.396 The histories of both the fair use doctrine and the right to a 
jury trial demonstrate that the law has carefully and deliberately 
developed a system for balancing interests of free speech against 
interests of creativity incentives, interests of individuals against 
interests of corporations, and interests of objective judgment against 
interests of subjective opinion. This system has been a communal 
assessment by peers. The dangers of deciding fair use on summary 
judgment illustrate the dangers of ignoring the constitutional right to 
a jury. 
 
Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2009) (stating that Dwyer & Collora, 
LLP represents plaintiff copyright holders); 1 ALMANAC, supra note 110, First Circuit, 
at 11 (stating former law firm of Judge Gertner as Dwyer, Collora and Gertner). 
 395 The fact that large corporations may win more cases than poor individuals in 
the fair use context does not by itself raise concern; favoring a party because the law 
mandates that outcome is not the danger here. 
 396 See, e.g., Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680 (Lord 
Ellenborough, C.J.) (submitting issue of fair use to jury). 
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B. Right of Speech 
The failure of judges to commit fair use issues to a jury creates 
another constitutional problem. It threatens a defendant’s speech 
rights under the First Amendment. Scholars and courts recognize that 
fair use merits constitutional protection: in some circumstances, 
repeating another’s expression should be protected as an act of speech, 
and where those circumstances exist, the First Amendment — through 
the doctrine of fair use — restrains congressional authority to 
suppress that repetition.397 Courts have uniformly held that that the 
doctrine of fair use contemplates speech interests of defendants, so a 
First Amendment challenge to copyright’s suppression of copied 
expression must invoke fair use.398 If a copier believes that her interest 
in free speech justifies her copying, she must rely on the fair use 
doctrine to assert that interest.399 In short, fair use is intended to 
satisfy the demands that free speech places on copyright. 
In view of the speech nature of fair use, summary judgment is a 
particularly inappropriate means to dispose of a fair use argument. As 
discussed above, one judge’s opinion on an inference in the fair use 
analysis may not reflect the consensus opinion of a jury.400 A risk 
therefore exists that summary judgment will foreclose a fair user from 
realizing an otherwise meritorious defense. Given the speech nature of 
fair use, this risk represents a threat to constitutionally protected 
speech.401 By failing to recognize an inference in the fair use analysis, a 
judge fails to recognize the possibility that speech is protected. A 
judge who disposes of a fair use argument on summary judgment 
necessarily ignores the wide disparity of opinion that arises in the 
factfinding process of the fair use analysis, and in so doing, the judge 
may impose liability on protected speech.  
The threat of summary judgment to speech has been recognized in a 
speech context similar to fair use — defamation.402 As in fair use, in 
 
 397 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as 
“free speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation[]”); Lemley & 
Volokh, supra note 135, at 165-66 (arguing that copying another person’s expression 
constitutes speech); Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 135, at 2433-34, 2466-70 
(arguing for procedural protections of free speech to apply to fair use expression). 
 398 See Eldred, 186 U.S. at 219, 221; see, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport 
Video, 349 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2003) (“First Amendment concerns in copyright 
cases are subsumed within the fair use inquiry.”). 
 399 See Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair use defense.”). 
 400 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 401 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 402 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (questioning 
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defamation a defendant’s speech rights turn on a subjective factfinding 
process: the factfinder must determine a defamation defendant’s 
intent.403 For this reason, courts never entertain a motion for summary 
judgment against a defamation defendant. Interestingly, though, 
courts have recognized the importance of summary judgments for 
defamation defendants on the grounds that the litigation cost of 
establishing facts to a jury might force a defendant to self-censor, 
introducing a potential for chilling of protected speech.404 By contrast, 
where the speech at issue is fair use expression, courts are ready and 
willing to rule against a defendant on summary judgment as a pure 
matter of law.405 
CONCLUSION 
Treating fair use as a pure issue of law violates the Seventh 
Amendment right to a civil jury and threatens the First Amendment 
right of free speech. It sacrifices truth for brevity.406 It destroys the 
delicate balance of power between judges and the people.407 It upends 
centuries of precedent.408 It thwarts due process.409 
These dangers have reached a zenith. Judges have invaded the 
constitutional province of the jury, stripping away ordinary citizens 
from the process due in cases where the law deprives individual 
members of its public of all their property.410 To disguise the invasion, 
 
whether deciding defamation on summary judgment is appropriate, given that 
decision requires ruling on actual malice).  
 403 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
 404 See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(“[A] motion for summary judgment in First Amendment cases is an approved 
procedure because unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect 
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and because speedy resolution of cases 
involving free speech is desirable.”); DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267 (N.J. 
2004) (justifying summary judgment for defendant in defamation action on grounds 
that “threat of prolonged and expensive litigation has a real potential for chilling . . . 
criticism and comment”). 
 405 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 406 Or perhaps it sacrifices truth and brevity. See SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS 
LEGUM ANGLIAE (IN PRAISE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND) 77 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1949) 
(1468) (“[A] jury of twelve citizens is the most powerful and efficient method for 
eliciting truth.”). 
 407 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 408 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 409 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 410 See, e.g., Ashby Jones, A Loss for Nesson: BU Student Hit with $675,000 Fine, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2009, 8:55 EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/08/03/a-
loss-for-nesson-bu-student-hit-with-675000-fine/ (describing college student’s fine of 
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judges have labeled issues of fact as issues of law, altering a traditional 
contour of copyright.411 The trend has become so common that judges 
are now questioning why in the past the jury was ever involved in the 
fair use analysis; they are now calling for the jury’s demise to be 
express and unqualified.412 And this rewriting of the jury’s role has left 
fair use speech unprotected. The abolition of the jury in fair use has 
begotten a constitutional crisis.  
It is time, then, to return to the original conception of fair use — as 
a fact-intensive inquiry most appropriate for the jury. Judges must 
recognize anew the factual nature of the fair use inquiry.413 They must 
appreciate that fair use inferences are laden with social value 
judgments that are best left to juries.414 Even where inferences seem 
obvious, judges must recognize that their own biases and values shape 
the framework through which they form opinions of fairness.415 They 
must recognize that juries are particularly well suited to form those 
opinions. The power of process must be recognized and respected. 
Fair use must be an issue of fact for the jury.416 
 
$675,000 where judge denied student opportunity to argue fair use to jury). 
 411 Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (implying that alteration of 
“traditional contours” in copyright law would raise constitutional concern). 
 412 See Order at 4, Capital Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661-NG (D. 
Mass. July 14, 2009) (Gertner, J.) (calling for examination of which institution — 
judge or jury — should decide questions of fair use and suggesting that that 
institution should be judge). 
 413 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 414 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 415 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 416 Cf. Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 
312, 321 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that summary judgment should be employed 
“sparingly” in copyright cases that raise issue of substantial similarity). 
